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Building on new behavioral and institutional theories, using a data set of about 450 variables and augmenting 
the Sala-i-Martin definition of robustness, we find evidence in support of the hypothesis that the standard causes 
of the shadow economy (SE), taxes, the administrative burden and labor market regulations, are not per se 
crucial in determining the size of the SE. There are many other influences with a consistently estimated 
plausible sign and whose quantitative impact appears to be even larger and more significant than that of the 
standard causes. Many of the robust influences emanate from relatively new theories such as elements of direct 
democracy, social interaction effects, moral aspects, and happiness, and from the institutional literature on the 
relative importance of specific institutions for economic performance. Most of them can well be influenced by 
governments. Hence, in order to reduce the SE and tax avoidance, a coordinated international strategy of using 
incentives to work, save, and invest in the official economy, including the behavior of the government, could be 
more successful than a strategy built on more government control, increased punishment and less freedom. The 
latter strategy would contradict the new theories and our evidence but appears to have been adopted by some 
OECD countries. Simulations of the size of the SE demonstrate their sensitivity to required velocity assumptions 
and show that previous estimates, including those of the so-called Mimic model, appear to be based on the very 
high end of possible velocity assumptions. Relatively low velocity assumptions can be defended much better 
and yield macro estimates of the SE consistent with the micro evidence. Finally, for the first time we separate 
the relatively large “criminal” shadow activity from the “non-criminal” one.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Research on the shadow economy (SE) grew tremendously during recent years and there are at least 
two important reasons: 
- In times of pressure on public finances in industrial countries due to relatively low economic growth, 
persistent unemployment, aging, and widening inequality of income under globalization, politicians 
increasingly criticize tax avoidance, unofficial labor and “unsocial behavior” and implemented 
measures to increase effective auditing and control of economic activity, raised the punishment level 
for tax violations and pressured countries with liberal tax laws to abolish their bank secrecy laws and 
provide information on foreign bank accounts.  
- Economic research extends more and more into the area of morality, social norms, social capital, and 
happiness, and finds strong evidence in experiments for social interactions such as pro-social 
behavior, reciprocity and fairness effects (e.g. Fortin et al., 2007, Carpenter and Matthews, 2004, 
Dohmen et al., 2009 and the overview by Riedl, 2010). 
 
However, despite this rapid growth there are important gaps in the SE literature which this paper 
attempts to address:  
- A distinction between the organized crime related and the other SE is not made, although this would 
be needed to make policies effective.  
- The empirical literature assumes few major standard causes of the SE, i.e. the tax and social 
security burden and the regulatory burden, often augmented by selected variables of interest such as 
specific institutional indicators, indicators of moral aspects etc. But regarding the standard causes it 
would be valuable for policy purposes to know in detail, which taxes and regulatory aspects are 
relevant and what their relative quantitative impact is compared to other influences. Thus, we aim for 
a systematic overview of institutional characteristics and other potentially relevant influences showing 
the quantitative influence in each case.  
- Hypotheses of conditional effects appear especially relevant in SE analyses because taxes, for 
instance, may well promote the SE, but this may depend on other factors such as the satisfaction of 
tax payers with the quality of public services they receive. This suggests testing for conditional effects 
through interaction models or other means, which are, however, lacking in empirical analyses of the 
SE. 
- In analyses that derive relatively high estimates of the ratios of the SE to official GDP often a 
discussion of the required assumption regarding velocity of currency used in the SE and of the 
sensitivity of the results to this assumption is missing as is exact information about the assumed 
velocity and the underlying estimated currency demand equations. Since relatively recently there has 
been a rebirth of the so-called MIMIC models in producing estimates of the SE (i.e. structural 
equations models employing selected multiple indicators and multiple causes of the SE, see, for 
instance, Breusch, 2005a). They yield an index of the estimated size of the SE whose transformation 
into actual ratios to GDP requires benchmarks of the size of the SE, which usually come from 
estimated currency models. While these papers usually present the estimated coefficients of the 
Mimic model, the estimated currency equations are not shown on which the results are ultimately 
based. Thus, we need to say which velocity assumption we make, discuss it, and show how sensitive 
the results are to it (see also Angrist and Pischke, 2010). Otherwise the incorrect impression in the 
public could be solidified that currency demand or Mimic models enable the economic science to 
provide a rather precise estimate of the size of the SE for each country.  
 
Hence, the emphasis in this paper is primarily on identifying as detailed as possible the many 
influences on the SE for policy purposes. The estimates of the size of the SE serve to demonstrate 
their fragility and sensitivity to velocity assumptions. Moreover, we ask which velocity assumption 
makes the macro estimates compatible with the extensive and growing micro evidence on the size of 
the SE. The latter tends to yield much lower estimates than many of the papers that use the currency 
or Mimic model. We find that the micro- and macro-evidence become consistent when assuming a 
relatively low but “normal” velocity (such as that of M2) and that the latter can be much better 
defended than a high velocity. Moreover, the critique of relatively high estimates of the SE is   4
increasing and this resulted in subsequent corrections by authors. For instance, for Australia 
estimates of the SE of about 15% of official GDP by an experienced analyst were corrected and new 
estimates delivered which were up to two thirds less than before. But these were again criticized as 
flawed and too high due to double counting, after which the new analysis was withdrawn from 
publication (see Breusch, 2006).  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:  
 
The following section 2 provides an overview of theories of the SE as the basis for the discussion of 
the estimation results. Section 3 describes our data and estimated models. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results with regard to the analyzed influences, estimated sizes of the SE and their 
sensitivity. In section 5 we use the results for proposing policies that should be effective in reducing 
the SE even if the overall evidence suggests the SE to be substantially smaller than often assumed, 
and section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2  Overview of theories of the shadow economy 
 
In order to systemize our analysis we propose a structure of 7 major categories of influences. The 
structure is used for an overview of theories, then to collect the needed data (see the variables 
collected in appendix 1) and also to present the estimated results.  
 
Our first category are constitutional aspects followed by the two standard presumed causes, namely, 
second, the tax and social security burden and, third, the administrative burden. Fourth is the quality of 
the administration and justice system, fifth is the group of economic institutions (property rights vs. 
contracting institutions, organization of the labor market, enforcement measures), sixth is values and 
moral aspects, and seventh is other influences and subjective factors. 
 
For reasons of space we rely on very brief summaries in the table highlighting main theoretical 
hypotheses and, if existing, associated formal models and empirical results. Also to save space we 
exclude the relatively young literature concerning interactions between the SE and the official 
economy.  
 
The overview shows the following: 
 
-  with the exception of categories one (constitution) and six (vales/moral), where theory predicts 
a negative sign for the SE if the characteristic under question is improving, many of the 
theories yield ambiguous results, and 
-  for a considerable range of theoretical hypotheses a formal theoretical model is still missing. In 
other words, although there has been much recent growth of the theoretical literature, there is 
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Table 1 
















Empirical result  




Democracy promotes growth of 
formal economy, particularly 
through less corruption  
SE:  ↓ ,  
Rivera-Batiz (2002) 
Elements of direct 
democracy  
no formal model  More direct political 
participation (especially 
“financial referenda“) tends to 
raise tax morale.  
Frey (1997),  
Slemrod (2003), 
Torgler (2005), 
Frey and Torgler (2007) 
SE: ↓,   
e.g. Swiss cantons, 










Example: City Porto 





a) direct democracy: better 
mechanism to implement 
policies 
b) representative democracy:  
better information for 
lawmakers about preferences 
of the median voter  
SE:  ? 
Political stability  no formal model  Political stability may dampen 
SE 





Minority rights   no formal model  Consideration may reduce 









Changes in tax burden cause:  
- income effect + 
- substitution effect. 
They work in opposite direction 
regarding labor supply, 
savings, investment. 
But if unemployment is high 
and tax burden is increased,  
income effect may dominate 
=> SE ↑, 
Additional effects: 
- „spite“ effect, „reciprocity“, tax 
evasion ↑, => SE ↑ 
Majority of studies:  
SE ↑ , 
e.g. Schneider 
(2005) for 110 
countries, Davis et 
al. (2005) for 20 
OECD countries with 
high per capita 
income;  
but also: SE ↓ or no 
effect, 
e.g. Friedman et al. 







- average,  
- direct, 
- indirect 
tax- and social 






Optimal SE or tax evasion  
depends upon: 
- probabilty to be detected,  
- degree of punishment, 
- degree of risk aversion. 
 
Weakness:  
- no intrinsic motivation, 
- model can explain tax 
evasion only when assuming  
unreasonably high degree of 
Presumes SE and 
tax evasion! 
But in certain 
countries the SE/ tax 
evasion id relatively 
small (e.g. 
Switzerland) despite 
relatively low level of 
controls and fines.  
 
Tax reform in Russia 
2001: SE/ tax 
evasion ↓  (cannot be   6
risk aversion  
- income exogenous; no 
relation between income 
generation, disutility of labor, 








(2008) ,  
Lin & Yang (2001), 
Yitzhaki (1974) 
- Higher punishment => SE 
and tax evasion ↓,  
- when there is SE and tax 
evasion: optimal government 
size ↓,  
- t ↑ => SE ? (theoretical result 
 ambiguous)  
Effect on SE of 
punishment and size 
of government 
unclear, 
t ↑ => SE unclear, 




burden of taxes and 
social security 
contributions 




Separation of formal and 
informal labor supply => 
income becomes endogenous:  
marginal tax rate ↑ =>  
formal labor supply ↓ and  
informal labor supply ↑ 
t ↑ => SE unclear, 




Progressivity ↑:  
formal labor supply ↓,  
risk taking ↑   =>   SE ↑ 
SE:   ↑    Progressivity of the 
burden of taxes and 
social security 




High marginal income taxation 
in young age of single-
households causes:  
- „spite“ effect,  
- interest in tax evasion, which   
  -if once inspired- continues 
SE:   ↑    
Complexity of the 
tax system 




- Complexity ↑ => SE ↓ owing 
to legal tax avoidance, e.g. use 
of tax loopholes;  
Further hypotheses (no  formal 
model): 
- Complexity increases 
uncertainty, unfairness, and 
undermines the constitution 
(e.g. when tax laws are out of 
reason, unclear, and/or when  
judicial decisions in tax matters 
depend e.g. on the region of 
the court); 
- Complexity promotes unequal 
income distribution and 
dampens tax progressivity. 
for Austria:  
following tax system 
simplification: 
Complexity↓ => SE ↑  




complexity↑ => SE ↑ 
(Thießen, 2003) 
Taxation of nominal 
capital income (e.g.  
- taxation of 
nominal interest 
income at the 
source  
- profit taxation 
without adequate 
conideration of the 
cost of own capital)  
 
Boadway & Bruce 
(1984), 
Rose & Petersen 
(2004), 
Nguyen & Rose 
(2004) 
 
- Distortion of saving/ 
investment decisions, 
- high effective or even 
expropriative taxation (when 
taxes exceed earned real 
income),  
- from an intertemporal 
viewpoint the saver is taxed 
higher than the non-saver at 
same lifetime income 
(avalanche effect of taxation).  
SE:   ↑  ? 
 
No recognition of 
other objective 
costs (e.g. limited 
recognition of 
borrowing costs)  
no explicit formal 
model 
same as previous  SE:   ↑  ? 
















- Formal activity may be 
hindered by an increasing 
number of laws and 
administrative rules; 
- more regulation harbors risk 
of more corruption; 
- with increasing size, the 
government becomes less 
efficient (caused, for instance, 
due to a production function 
with decreasing economies of 
scale and/or a bureaucracy 
which pursues its own goals). 
SE:   ↑    




no explicit formal 
model  
Dissatisfaction with quality of 
public goods and services ↑: 
SE  ↑  
SE:   ↑    










lity of the justice 
system 
Glaeser et al. 
(2000) 
De-facto independence of 
prosecution from executive 
authority =>  incentives for 
prosecution to proceed against 
malpractice & corruption ↑ => 
corruption ↓  
SE:  ↓   ? 
de facto indepen-
dence of justice 
system ↑, corruption 
in government ↓ , 
Aaken et al. (2008) 
“Property rights 
institutions” versus 








“Protection of property rights” 
appears to be quantitatively 
more important than 
“contracting institutions” in 
determining economic 
performance (growth of official 
GDP and the quality of 
institutions): SE: ↓ 
SE:  ↓  
SE is commonly 
analyzed from the 
perspective of the 
regulation of the 
labor market, e.g.:  
Tokman (1992), 
Loayza (1997)  
 
- Excessive regulation and 
taxes (with weak enforcement) 
=> labor costs ↑ +  excessive 
demands on the supply of 
public goods =>  SE ↑  
 
 
SE:   ↑ ?: 
but high SE in 
countries with 
relatively flexible 
labor market (e.g. 
Mexico), 
and movement of 
formal to informal 
labor not only during 
recessions but during 
boom periods, e.g. 
Maloney (1999, 
2004). 
= contradiction to 
many labor market 
models  
Sorting: 
Boeri & Garibaldi 
(2005) 
- above all less qualified 
workers work in the SE,  
- SE is to some extent being 
tolerated by the government to 
dampen unemployment, 
 - more controls and 
punishment will only increase 
unemployment,  
- deregulation of labor market 
is required  
For OECD countries 
there is a high 
positive correlation 




Brasil and particularly 






































e.g. Mortensen & 
Assumes existence of shadow 
economy even when there is 
no taxation. 
Decision for informel work 
But high SE exists 
also in countries with 
very flexible labor 
market (e.g. Mexico),   8
Pissarides (1994),    
Boeri & Garibaldi 
(2002), Albrecht et 
al. (2006), 
Bosch & Pretel 
(2006)  
mainly determined by 
productivity of economic 
agents. Productivity, in turn, is  
determined by human capital 
(education). 
and movement from 
formal to informal 
work also in boom 
periods  e.g. 
Mahoney (1999, 
2004). 
no explicit formal 
model but influence 
of regulation 
analyzed in 
Johnson et al. 
(1997) 
Hypotheses: 
High flexibility: labor costs ↓:  
unemployment + SE↓,  
but if wages are highly volatile:  
SE ↑ 
SE:   ↑ ↓ ? 
no explicit formal 
model  
Hypotheses: 
High fixed costs: labor costs ↑: 
unemployment + SE ↑,   
but if hire & fire policy: SE ↑ 
SE:   ↑ ↓ ? 
no explicit formal 
model  
Hypotheses: 
if minimum wage is higher than 
marginal product of labor:  
unemployment ↑ + SE ↑ ; 
if minimum wage increases 
income => search for informal 
employment ↓ => SE ↓ 
SE:   ↑ ↓ ? 
no explicit formal 
model  
Hypotheses: 
- unemployment ↓, SE ↓ ,  
- no influence on SE, 
- labor cost ↑,  unempl. + SE ↑ , 
SE:   ↑ ↓  ? 
no explicit formal 
model  
- Productivity ↑,  unemployment 
+ SE ↓ 
- labor costs ↑,  unempl. + SE ↑ 













Fixed costs for 























- better integration of workers 
in the system and in 
enterprises  
- better produktivity of 
employees: less incentive to 
work informally  
- better management and more 
success   => SE ↓     
- Strengthening of long term 
interests vis-a-vis fincial 
investors with short term 
interest  
OR 
- higher costs, slower 
decisions, less success => 
unemployment ↑ => SE ↑ 
SE:    ↑ ↓ ? 
 
 
Proft sharing   no explicit formal 
model 
Same as co-determination   SE:  ↑ ↓  ?  
Becker (1968) 
 
From viewpoint of social 
welfare is the maximum level of 
punishment always optimal, 
because fines cause no cost in 
contrast to controls  
=> Maximum punishment 
desirable. 
Maximum fine for 
activity in SE/tax 
evasion not 
observable. In 
several countries the 
level of punishment 
and controls risis.  
Punishment and 
controls  
Davidson et al. 
(2004) 
 
Market imperfections (e.g. at 
the capital market, asymme-
trical informations) can reduce 
the optimal (maximum) level of 
punishment. Optimal 
In OECD countries 
very different levels 
of punishment for  
SE/tax evasion, 
although market   9
punishment is lower than ist 
maximum degree.  
imperfections are not 
as diverse 
Tyron & Feld 
(2005), 
Slemrod (2007) 
Elements of direct democracy 
can reduce the optimal level of 
punishment => optimal degree 
of punishment lower than 
maximum degree 
Switzerland: 
relatively low SE size 
despite rel. low level 
of punishment for tax 
law violations (tax 
avoidance is no 
criminal offence). 
Frey and Feld (2002) 
Switzerland:  
participation rights ↑: 
tax morale ↑ 








Punishment ↑: „crowding out“ 
of the intrinsic motive for tax 
honesty through extrinsic 
motive, dependent upon tax 
and regulatory burden, supply 
and quality of public goods and 
services, etc.=> SE ↑ 
Punishment 
(conditional) ↑:   
SE ↑  ? 
Feld and Larsen 
(2006) for Germany: 
no significant 
negative effect of 
higher controls and 
punishment on the 
SE. 
Social Capital / 
Trust 
no explicit formal 
model 
Voluntary membership and 
collaboration in organisations  
increases sense of respon-
sibilty for the community/ 
society (Putnam 2000); 
Trust –between strangers- 
lowers transaction costs  
SE: ↓  ? 
For US: Dincer & 
Uslaner (2009): Trust 
promotes official 
economic growth and 
manufacturing 




Slemrod, J. (2003), 
Kannianen, 
Pääkönen, 




Tax morale  =  intrinsic motive 
for honesty  
 
tax morale ↑ = SE  ↓  
SE: ↓  ? 
Feld and Frey (2002, 
2004), Torgler 





Tax morale is influ-
enced by age, edu-
cation, employment 
status, religion, qua-
lity of political insti-
tutions: Alm and Tor-
gler (2006) and Frey 
and Torgler (2007). 
 
Moral suasion has no 
influence on tax mo-
rale (Torgler, 2004) 
Religion Kannianen, 
Pääkönen (2007)  
Culture and religion influence 
morale and tax honesty  
no influence of 
religion on tax morale 
in Europe (catholic 






Social norms and 
interactions 
Fortin, Lacroix and 
Vileval (2007):  
= Allingham- 
Sandmo-Yitzhaki 
Modell with social 
Tax honesty is influenced also 




Evidence for social 
interactions in 
experiments:  
significant are:  
- reciprocity and    10
Interactions 
 










Little evidence for people being 
purely self-interested or for 
education making them more 
self-interested. Fairness 
considerations tend to increase 
with age and work experience.  
Only a minority is motivated by 
income-maximization alone but 
people are imperfect 
conditional cooperators and 
tend to become income-
maximizing free-riders. 
- „fairness“ Effects:  
e.g.  
Fortin et al. (2007),  
Carpenter and 
Matthews (2004), 
Dohmen et al.(2009), 





Corruption  Choi & Thum 
(2005), 
Johnson et al 
(1997) 
 
Choi and Thum (2005): 
SE offers possibility to avoid 
corruption and dampens 
distortions caused by economic 
policy =>  
SE is substitute for corruption 
und SE promotes official 
economy (= SE is 
complementary to official 
economy).   
Johnson et al (1997) :  
SE and corruption are 
complementary; SE is a 
substitute for official economy. 
Dreher & Schneider (2006): 
in countries with high income: 
SE and corruption are 
substitutes; 
in countries with low income: 
SE and corruption are 
complementary. 
Corruption ↑: SE:   ↑ , 
for 49 countries  
Johnson et al. 
(1999), 
However for high per 
capita income 
countries, Dreher & 
Schneider (2006):  
Corruption ↑:  SE ↓,  
(SE is substitute for 
corruption und 
complematary to 
official economy);  
in low per capita 
income countries: 
Corruption ↑: SE:  ↑ 
(SE and corruption 
are complementary 
and a substitute for 
official economy) 
Globalization   no explicit formal 
model 
Increasing competition on 
goods- and factor markets 
raises uncertainty of income 
and employment  





unemployment => SE ↑ 
 
SE:   ↑  , 
for USA: Dell'Anno 
and Solomon (2008) 
Inequality of the 
income distribution  
(several definitions 
are possible: e.g. in 
a society, between 




Inequality results in 
disadvantages for groups with 
low income if institutional 
quality and protection of 
property rights is relatively low. 
These groups will then work in 
the SE where they can retain 
their full production. 
SE:   ↑  , 




















Leviathan restraint hypothesis: 
Decentralization (horizontal 
and vertical competition of 
governments) may prevent 
revenue maximizing behavior 
of government => SE ↓ 
Decentralization results in 
lower quality of government 
decisions, more corruption, and 
increased influence of interest 
groups => SE ↑ 
SE: ?   11
Quantity und quality 
of public goods and 
services  
Johnson et al. 
(1997) 
Satisfaction increases tax 
morale and dampens SE 
SE:   ↓  ? 
Efficiency of public 
goods supply  
no explicit formal 
model 
Inefficiencies of public goods 
supply assumed or observed 
by taypayers dampen the tax 
morale => SE ↑  
SE:   ↓  ? 
„Fairness“ of tax 
system/ social law  
 
see complexity of 
tax system  
e.g.:  
- impossibilty to use tax 
loopholes with a relatively low 
income,   
- disregard by tax laws of 
certain costs/risks in calculated 
profits and applying a relatively 
high marginal tax rate,  
- dependence of court rulings 
in tax matters on the location 
(region) of the court etc. 
SE:  ↑  ? 
„Fairness“ of 
remuneration  
no explicit formal 
model 
„Fairness“ effect,  
reciprocity = > SE ↑  
SE:      ↑ ? 
Influence of woman   no explicit formal 
model 
Hypothesis: 
more influence of women in 
politics and enterprises may 
reduce risk taking and increase 
fairness: SE ↓   
SE:    ↑ ↓? 
Woman pursue tax 
avoidance less (e.g. 
Baldry 1986)  
Treatment of 
taxpayers through 
tax authority  
Akerlof (1982), 
Osterloh and Frey 
(2000) 
Implicit „psychological contract“ 
between tax authority and 
taxpayer owing to – in 
particular- participation rights 
(elements of direct democracy) 




by an index of “direct 
democracy”  




crisis” if the 
executive branch 
undermines 
decisions by the 
judiciary 




- poor control of 
enterprises/banks owned by 
the government => losses; 
- tax increases or old-age 
pension cuts with preferential 
treatment of certain groups 
such as civil servants; 
- excecutive branch applies 
court rulings only to the 
individual that won the case 
even if the ruling has general 
meaning; 
- excecutive branch prevents 
such court decisions by mutual 
agreement with the taxpayer 
who filed the complaint; 
- executive branch and 
legislature implement a fee or 
tax despite significant 
probability that higher courts 
will later rule against it. 
SE:  ↑ ? 
Conduct of 
executive boards of 
enterprises, 
supervisory boards, 
financial investors  




- short term profit maximization 
with adverse long run effects 
for the company; 
- insufficient control of 
executive boards through 
owners and supervisory 
boards;  
SE:  ↑ ?   12
- flawed, uncoordinated 
strategy pursued by executive 
board;  
- little acceptance of laws,  
- dubious open or hidden profit 
distribution and dubious 
royalties.  
 
Source: own compilation 
 
 
3 Data, definition, and models  
 
Our data set includes a maximum of 38 countries, which are all OECD countries and eight Eastern 
European countries
2. We use the OECD data base for standard macroeconomic variables
3 and the 
IFS and ECB statistics for monetary aggregates. Proxies for the variables of the seven major groups 
defined above of causes of and influences on the shadow economy are shown in Appendix 1, 
“indicators and sources”. This table provides a somewhat more detailed breakdown of the seven 
major groups of variables compared to table 1, because data are available regarding some potentially 
relevant influences on the shadow economy even where a theoretical hypothesis or model has not yet 
been established. For instance, this refers to the fifth major group “economic institutions” regarding 
particular labor market characteristics and the innovation potential of countries, and it refers to the 
seventh group (other influences and subjective factors), where data are available on political 
decentralization, globalization, gender, feelings and expectations, financial secrecy, and aging.  
 
Regarding indicators of the shadow economy, this study aimed at using alternatives to the most used 
indicator, currency in circulation relative either to the population or to M2. These alternatives are 
shown at the bottom of the table of appendix 1.  
 
However, the first shown variable, the estimates of Schneider (2007), cannot be used because they 
were derived on the basis of currency regressions.
4  
The third indicator, the ‘world economic forum’ survey of the size of the informal sector assessed by 
enterprise executives in a large number of countries (wef616), is available in most cases for the years 
2000-2005 but after changing its scale in 2004, which was then inverted in 2005, the indicator was 
dropped completely without replacement. Apparently there have been problems with this indicator and 
it has a low negative correlation with estimates of currency per capita. 
The fourth and fifth indicator by the world value survey (‘cheating on taxes justifiable’, f116b) and 
Fraser Institute (‘extra payments/bribes’, f5n), respectively, also have very limited observations 
because for the considered period 1991-2007 the world value survey performed only up to a 
                                                 
2 The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States plus eight 
Eastern European EU countries Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak 
Republic, and Slovenia.  
3  This includes GDP, GDP in PPP, population, price indices, various employment, non-employment and 
unemployment measures, interest rates etc. 
4 Increasingly, estimates of the SE are based on the use of so called MIMIC models (i.e. structural equations 
models employing selected multiple indicators and multiple causes of the SE). But these models yield an index 
of the estimated size of the SE whose transformation to actual ratios of the SE to GDP requires benchmarks of 
the size of the SE. These benchmarks are usually taken from Schneider (2007) or earlier papers by Schneider 
where he shows estimated ratios of the SE to official GDP based on currency regressions. Therefore, the 
results of MIMIC models are ultimately based on currency regressions. However, one cannot find the estimated 
currency equations. Only shown are estimated ratios of the SE to official GDP. See also Breusch (2005a) for an 
elaboration of this issue and MIMIC models to estimate the SE.   13
maximum of four surveys and the Fraser indicator is available only for 1995 and the years 2000-2005. 
In addition, these indicators have a small and negative correlation with per capita currency holdings. 
The sixth indicator (employment in the unofficial economy in the capital of the country as % of official 
employment, infsec) is available only for 4 countries and for two years. The last and seventh indicator 
(share of sales reported for tax purposes) is available only for transition countries and Turkey.  
Hence, despite all efforts we are confined to using currency as the only indicator with satisfying 
availability and comparable quality over countries and years (see appendix 2 for details).  
 
Given this indicator, our definition of the SE is already determined because only those “underground” 
transactions can be considered that are carried out using currency. 
 
Also included in the table of appendix 1 are a few variables with a question mark attached to them, 
indicating additional data needs in order to test adequately relevant theoretical models.
5 Admittedly, 
this is not to say that the available data are in each case fully satisfying. But an attempt was made to 
consider all available sources, including survey data, yielding a total of more than 20 sources.  
 
The period chosen, 1991-2007, is the result of attempting to collect long run data while at the same 
time considering “soft” variables of theoretical importance which have been available in quantitative 
form only since relatively recently, such as preferences of economic agents, their views, for instance, 
on the quality of public services, on the complexity of the tax system, on corruption and so on. Also 
detailed data on the tax burden and labor market characteristics are available only since about the 
early 1990s. The frequency chosen was annual data.   
 
However, several important variables and especially the survey data, have considerable gaps as 
noted. Hence, the data was averaged over the sample period with only one observation per country, 
which, in the best case, would be a long run average. As discussed, this interpretation is limited, 
however, by the availability of the data.  
 
Since the goal of the analysis is to examine the influences on the shadow economy as detailed as 
possible, including potential interactions between especially the tax and social security burden and 
the satisfaction of taxpayers with the quantity and quality of public services, there is a general form of 
the equations to be estimated as follows:  
 
 
Ci/M2i  = a0 + a1 Σ Xi + a2 Cri + a3 Σ DSEi + a4 V/SFij + a5 (Ti * V/SFij)  
       ( +/- )         (? )         ( ? )           ( ? )        ( ? ) 
 
+ a6 DEEU + a7 DEURO  +  ei  ,               (1) 
      ( ?  )            ( ? ) 
 
where (Ci/M2i ) is the ratio of currency holdings to M2 and X is a vector of the determinants of the 
currency to M2 ratio as suggested by monetary theory
6. Cr represents an indicator of serious crime 
and thus the “criminal” part of the shadow economy, e.g. drug trafficking, handling of stolen goods, 
contract killing etc., i.e. activities that cannot be integrated into the legal economy through better 
incentives and policies aiming at reducing the SE.  
DSE is a vector of the explanatory variables of the SE shown in groups 1-6 in the table of variables, 
appendix 1, some of which have been used in previous studies and are well known such as the tax, 
                                                 
5 Examples of important missing variables (comparable over countries) are good indicators of the degree of 
taxpayers’ satisfaction with the quality of public services, taxpayers’ risk aversion regarding tax avoidance, the 
probability for detection of tax fraud, the degree of punishment, social capital, “serious” and “light” crime, typical 
informal activity such as illegal employment in construction, educational attainment, and the quality and/or the 
efficacy of executive boards (management of private companies).  
6 Following the Keynesian liquidity preference we include the volume of transactions proxied by real GDP per 
capita and the real short term interest rate.   14
social security and administrative burden, economic institutions, and others are new such as the 
quality of administration and of the justice system. V/SF represents the variables of group 6 
‘values/moral’ and 7 ‘subjective factors and other influences’ in the table, appendix 1, which are to a 
large extent new and have not been used before in studies of the SE, such as the quality of particular 
public services (public schools, public infrastructure, police services), the subjective assessment of 
wastefulness of government spending, the subjective satisfaction with people in national office, ethical 
behavior of firms, etc.). 
 
Especially regarding the tax burden, the hypothesis is that it is not the burden per se which causes 
shadow economic activity but rather the relation of it to the public services which taxpayers receive 
and/or the subjective satisfaction with public officials and/or enterprise managements and their 
supervisory boards, the quality of management-labor relations which may influence the SE. Such 
conditional hypotheses may be tested by including a corresponding interaction term as shown in 
equation 1, where the tax burden T is multiplied by the value/subjective factor V/SFj. Such interaction 
terms have – to the best of my knowledge – not yet been used in studies on the shadow economy. 
  
Finally, two dummies are included to account for the special situation of Eastern European transition 
countries and for anomalies of currency holdings during the time of the introduction of the Euro in the 
EMU countries. Subscript i denotes the country and subscript j the type of subjective factor. The signs 
in brackets shown below coefficients represent the theoretically expected sign of the respective 
estimated coefficient, which is unambiguous only in the cases of the monetary theory variables X 
7.  
 
A large number of preliminary estimations was run to test equation 1 and its robustness. Specifically, 
for the interaction term all possible combinations of different tax variables of group 2 with 
values/subjective factors of groups 6 and 7 were used and the remaining variables of groups 1-7 were 
included alternately as potential DSE variables. The estimated sign of the interaction term a5 was, 
however, highly unstable, although in most cases highly statistically significant. Despite further efforts 
to reduce the specification of equation 1, using different functional forms and logs of the variables, this 
problem persisted. Hence, there was no alternative but to put off the attempt to estimate conditional 
influences on the shadow economy through inclusion of an interaction term for future research.  
 
This preliminary work showed that in order to obtain stable and robust results the specification needs 
to be as parsimonious as possible. Our used base model thus is:  
 
Ci/M2i  =  a0 + a1 Σ Xi + a2 ki + a3 mi + ei               ( 2 )  
 
where X represents, as before, the monetary theory variables, k represents either one of the 42 tax 
and social security burden variables of our second group in the table of variables (appendix 1) or one 
of the over 30 labor market variables of the fifth group. Indicator “m” represents all other influences, 
i.e. constitutional aspects (group 1), complexity of the tax system (group 2), administrative burden 
(group 3), quality of administration and justice system (group 4), economic institutions except labor 
market indicators (group 5), values and moral aspects (group 6), and subjective factors and other 
influences (group 7). Up to 200 variables were used for m in all. Also on account of the findings of the 
preliminary estimations we abstained from any transformation of the data. The regressions were run 
employing OLS and also by the instrumental methods two stage least squares and GMM since 
potential endogeniety of regressors cannot be excluded.  
 
This approach is an unavoidable compromise between specifying strictly according to theoretical 
reasoning that is in many cases too demanding relative to the available data and its quality, and 
identification of robust influences while retaining a minimum of controls.  
 
                                                 
7 The sign of the interest rate should be negative due to rising opportunity costs of currency holdings and the 
sign of real per capita GDP should be positive due to more transactions and higher wealth.   15
Given the large number of combinations of the two groups of k variables (the many tax and social 
security burden variables and labor market characteristics) with the m variables, equation 2 allows 
analyzing the influences on the shadow economy to a degree of detail not seen before. The resulting 
large output of regression results calls for an automated summarizing evaluation, which was carried 
out through special excel programs.
8 The results are clearly laid out in the following overview tables 
regarding taxes, labor market variables and other influences, where one cell shows the summarized 
results of up to 200 regressions for each of the three estimation methods.  
 
An indicator was defined to be relatively significant or robust if in the majority of cases in each of the 
three estimation methods the same sign was obtained and if this sign was statistically significant -at 
least at the ten percent significance level- in 30 percent or more of the cases of at least one 
estimation method.
9 However, most variables that fulfilled this definition were also relatively 
statistically significant in the other two estimation methods. The indicators found to be relatively 
significant or robust were included in a ranking of their quantitative impact on the shadow economy 
using the average beta coefficient of all three estimation methods.  
 
However, regarding simulations of the size of the shadow economy in this cross-section panel we use 
an augmented version of equation 2 where we include an indicator of serious crime so as to be able 
to separate the estimated “crime-based” or “criminal” shadow economy from the “non-crime based” 
SE and we include the two dummies for Eastern European countries and regarding the Euro 
introduction, respectively: 
 
Ci/M2i    =    a0 + a1 Σ Xi + a2 Cri + a3 Σ DSEi + a6 Dosteu + a7 DEURO+  ei       (3) 
 
Finally, in all regressions we used the currency to M2 ratio unadjusted for estimated currency holdings 
abroad rather then currency per capita or currency per capita adjusted for estimated currency 
holdings abroad, and we used no transformed data, because the statistical significance of the results 
was consistently slightly higher. 
 
 
4 Empirical  results   
 
4.1 Tax and social security burden 
 
The results of our analysis of the first major group of potential causes of the shadow economy, the 
tax and social security burden, are shown in table 2. To save space the details of the regressions 
and estimation methods used are explained in a footnote of the table. For each analyzed fiscal 
indicator there are 2 lines in columns 2, 3, and 4, which summarize the results of 199 estimated 
regressions.  
                                                 
8 These programs were written by Pierre Wohlleben. Regarding our main dependent variable C/M2 about 64000 
regressions were evaluated. 
9 The best accepted definition of robustness is that of Sala-i-Martin (1997), which stipulates that the 90% interval 
(between the 5
th and 95
th percentile) in the distribution of a parameter does not include zero. The distribution is 
derived, however, from estimating the variable of interest using all possible combinations of variables, including 
non-plausible ones. And only the estimated sign matters for robustness, not the significance. Our definition is 
somewhat more restrictive because we consider not only the estimated sign but also the significance. In 
addition our estimation set does not include all possible combinations of variables. Hence, it is possible for an 
indicator to be ‘Sala-i-Martin robust’ but not according to our definition, and vice versa. We have three major 
robustness result tables, on taxes (table 2), on labor market indicators (table 4), and concerning other factors 
(table 6). Roughly, if 90 percent of the regressions performed in each cell are non-zero, the respective indicator 
would be Sala-i-Martin robust. As can be seen in table 2, this condition is met if in 179 of the total of 199 
regressions the sign is positive or negative. But many indicators, which meet this requirement, do not meet our 
definition because their significance is lacking. At the same time, in tables 4 and 6, a few results meet our 
definition of robustness but not quite the Sala-i-Martin definition. This brief discussion may corroborate our 
chosen definition.   16
 
In the first line the dominating estimated sign of the respective fiscal indicator is shown together with 
the number of regressions yielding this sign. The second number is the number of regressions where 
this sign is statistically significant (at least at the 10% level of significance); the third value is the 
number of countries included in the majority of all regressions; the last and fourth value is the beta 
coefficient (the estimated effect on the shadow economy of the respective fiscal variable in standard 
deviation units, which allows a direct comparison of the relative quantitative influence of all estimated 
coefficients). The beta coefficients also allow a ranking of tax variables according to their quantitative 
impact.  
 
The second row gives results of statistical tests of the regressions (number of significant tests related 
to the specification error in OLS regressions, regarding the endogeniety of regressors and validity of 
instruments used in the 2SLS and GMM regressions). Those fiscal indicators found to be relatively 
statistically significant, robust, according to the above chosen definition were highlighted. Those tax 
indicators, whose estimated sign was unstable, were denoted “fragile”, and those whose sign was 
consistently statistically insignificant, were denoted “ins.” (insignificant). The few cases, where the 
estimation methods yielded ambiguous results, were italicized. 
 
As can be seen, the association between our fiscal indicators (tax burden, social security burden, 
transfers and subsidies) and the shadow economy is generally positive. A few tax indicators have a 
robust positive sign independent of the estimation method. This refers to the social security burden 
of employers, the total tax wedge in broad definitions, subsidies and transfers, taxes on 
international trade and government size.  
 
Noteworthy is that the many tax wedge measures are consistently pointing to higher taxation 
resulting in more shadow economic activity. There is no difference in the relative importance of 
marginal versus average tax rates.  
 
Indirect taxes have also an estimated generally positive sign, although not significant. Given the 
below discussed move to a simplified and consumption based tax system this result would be 
welcomed. However, and admittedly, it is not clear whether the insignificance may be interpreted as 
evidence that indirect taxes do not matter for shadow economic activity. The reason is that a 
breakdown is not available of indirect tax revenues that can be evaded relatively easily and those that 
cannot. For instance, purchasing a home or new car or other high priced consumer goods on the 
black market to evade VAT/sales tax is nearly impossible in industrial countries. Since a non-
negligible part of indirect tax revenues falls in this group, it is noteworthy that nevertheless the 
estimated sign of the association between indirect taxes and the shadow economy is mostly positive. 
In other words, the positive sign could become statistically significant if we had data of only those 
indirect tax revenues that can be relatively easily evaded, for instance, some services. Hence, there 
may be reasons to take the positive sign of indirect taxes serious, despite its insignificance. A move to 
consumption taxation would thus need to consider this, for instance, by emphasizing measures to 
broaden the tax base. 
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Table 2
Summary of Estimation results
Influence of the tax and social security burden on the shadow economy: Cross-section regression results: each cell represents 199 regressions.
Shadow Economy proxied by estimated currency holdings relative to M2 (cm2ifs).
OLS 2SLS GMM
Total tax burden:
- Total tax revenue (% of GDP), OECD + 196, 59 s., 30, 0.2181 + 193, 4 s., 30, 0.1526 + 172, 15 s., 30, 0.1184
11 10, 11 / 49, 49, 1 1 / 1
- Total receipts general government (% of GDP), OECD + 191, 24 s., 30, 0.1703 + 176, 7 s., 30, 0.1373 + 145, 21 s., 30, 0.1092
5 3, 3 / 46, 46, 0 1 / 0
Social security burden: 
- Tax and social security burden (% of GDP), OECD + 197, 144 s., 28, 0.3000 + 196, 11 s., 28, 0.1999 + 185, 11 s., 28, 0.1326
9 26, 39 / 43, 43, 1 9 / 1
- Employees’ social security  contributions (average rate; two-earner married couple,  + 197, 130 s., 28, 0.2328 + 199, 20 s., 28, 0.2228 + 196, 32 s., 28, 0.1795
one at 100% of average earnings and the other at 67 %, 2 children), OECD 2 1, 0 / 28, 27, 0 4 / 0
- Social security contrib. labor (% of GDP),  OECD + 197, 7 s., 27, 0.1827 + 196, 7 s., 27, 0.1850 + 187, 20 s., 27, 0.1616
1 1, 2 / 18, 18, 3 0 / 3
- Social security contrib. employers (% of GDP), OECD + 197, 197 s., 27, 0.4634 + 199, 175 s., 27, 0.5097 + 199, 187 s., 27, 0.5698
4 4, 3 / 7, 6, 2 4 / 2
Tax wedges:
- Tax wedge incl. soc.sec. (aver. rate; aver. of all income and family types; in %), OECD + 197, 195 s., 30, 0.3423 + 198, 65 s., 30, 0.2876 + 199, 148 s., 30, 0.2875
0 2, 3 / 42, 42, 12 0 / 12
- Tax wedge (average rate; two-earner married couple,  + 197, 186 s., 30, 0.3189 + 198, 38 s., 30, 0.2422 + 197, 92 s., 30, 0.2366
one at 100% of average earnings and the other at 67 %, 2 children, %), OECD 2 5, 7 / 55, 54, 11 2 / 11
- Tax wedge (marginal rate; average of all income and family types; in %), OECD + 197, 149 s., 30, 0.2820 + 191, 6 s., 30, 0.1698 + 179, 22 s., 30, 0.1348
2 8, 7 / 61, 60, 21 3 / 21
- Tax wedge (marginal rate; two-earner married couple, + 197, 184 s., 30, 0.3139 + 196, 28 s., 30, 0.2467 + 195, 74 s., 30, 0.2420
one at 100% of average earnings and the other at 67 %, 2 children, %), OECD 2 4, 5 / 58, 57, 37 3 / 37
- Tax wedge (marginal rate; single person at 167% of av. earnings, no child), OECD + 193, 6 s., 30, 0.1401 + 191, 4 s., 30, 0.1404 + 175, 14 s., 30, 0.1270
3 2, 1 / 41, 41, 3 2 / 3
- Personal income tax rate (average of 6 earnings levels and 5 family types, %), OECD fragile, 30, 0.0241 - 154, 6 s., 30, -0.1144 - 133, 4 s., 30, -0.0523
2 19, 17 / 31, 31, 0 2 / 0
- Personal income tax rate (average rate; two-earner married couple,  fragile, 30, 0.0008 - 170, 7 s., 30, -0.1571 - 135, 11 s., 30, -0.0728
one at 100% of average earnings and the other at 67 %, 2 children, %), OECD 2 20, 18 / 29, 29, 0 4 / 0
- Taxes on income, profits & capital gains of individuals (% of GDP), OECD fragile, 29, 0.0066 - 192, 4 s., 29, -0.2438 - 146, 14 s., 29, -0.1403
3 57, 39 / 26, 26, 1 9 / 1
- Taxes on capital gains of individuals (% of GDP), OECD  fragile, 27, 0.0020 - 184, 4 s., 27, -0.1911 - 184, 107 s., 27, -0.3105
2 25, 28 / 7, 7, 1 55 / 1
Direct personal taxes:
- Total direct taxes (% of GDP), OECD - 168, 8 s., 28, -0.1168 - 188, 14 s., 28, -0.2562 - 169, 18 s., 28, -0.2096
6 12, 10 / 25, 25, 2 7 / 2
- Total direct personal taxes (% of GDP), OECD fragile, 25, -0.0203 - 174, 3 s., 25, -0.2486 - 167, 9 s., 25, -0.2403
21 16, 15 / 35, 35, 5 12 / 5
- Top marginal personal tax rate, OECD et al. - 187, 152 s., 36, -0.2035 - 165, 6 s., 36, -0.1327 + 136, 6 s., 36, 0.0421
179 9, 6 / 34, 33, 12 14 / 12
- Top marginal Income tax rate and income threshold at which it applies, Fraser + 193, 164 s., 38, 0.2536 + 185, 6 s., 38, 0.1621 fragile, 38, 0.0633
164 3, 3 / 68, 67, 18 4 / 18
- Top marginal income and payroll tax rate (and income threshold at which it applies), Fraser - 140, ins., 36, -0.0124 - 195, 116 s., 36, -0.3022 - 192, 145 s., 36, -0.3028
170 165, 149 / 30, 30, 22 127 / 22
- Taxation of nominal interest income (dummy), own - 158, 2 s., 38, -0.0419 - 197, 122 s., 38, -0.2982 - 198, 155 s., 38, -0.3272
168 165, 163 / 14, 14, 3 165 / 3
Subsidies, transfers and others
- Subsidies (% of GDP), OECD + 196, 102 s., 28, 0.2360 + 199, 93 s., 28, 0.3538 + 197, 147 s., 28, 0.3396
23 5, 4 / 9, 9, 1 4 / 1
- Subsidies and other transfers (% of expense), WDI + 197, 166 s., 36, 0.2290 + 199, 178 s., 36, 0.4532 + 198, 188 s., 36, 0.4120
57 151, 143 / 5, 5, 1 117 / 1
- Transfers & subsidies (% of GDP), Fraser  (less subs../transf. => higher indicator value) - 193, 34 s., 38, -0.1612 - 199, 173 s., 38, -0.3754 - 199, 191 s., 38, -0.3608
163 111, 107 / 7, 7, 4 54 / 4
- Taxes less subsidies on products (% of GDP), OECD - 193, 44 s., 34, -0.1318 - 159, 12 s., 34, -0.1376 - 198, 20 s., 34, -0.2164
44 9, 7 / 11, 11, 2 6 / 2
- Taxes on production and imports less subsidies (% of GDP), OECD - 193, 44 s., 34, -0.1253 - 161, 11 s., 34, -0.1293 - 197, 22 s., 34, -0.2081
53 7, 8 / 11, 11, 2 9 / 2
Taxes on international trade:
- Taxes on international trade (% of GDP), Fraser + 186, 167 s., 38, 0.2739 + 184, 148 s., 38, 0.3850 + 183, 158 s., 38, 0.3225
178 16, 7 / 11, 11, 11 7 / 11
- Customs and import duties  (% of GDP), OECD   + 194, 141 s., 30, 0.2839 + 196, 180 s., 30, 0.4139 + 195, 164 s., 30, 0.4134
8 20, 9 / 8, 6, 5 12 / 5
Government size, transfers and subsidies:
- Government size, Heritage  (smaller size => higher indicator vale) - 184, 16 s., 38, -0.0921 - 196, 60 s., 38, -0.2305 - 194, 105 s., 38, -0.2069
172 2, 4 / 23, 23, 19 3 / 19
- Government size, Fraser (smaller size => higher indicator value) - 186, 6 s., 38, -0.0968 - 199, 119 s., 38, -0.2872 - 197, 168 s., 38, -0.2929
157 127, 124 / 11, 11, 13 117 / 13
Mixed personal and corporate taxes:
- Property taxes (% of GDP), OECD - 197, 188 s., 30, -0.3158 - 199, 119 s., 30, -0.4413 - 199, 185 s., 30, -0.4727
1 5, 6 / 8, 8, 5 13 / 5
- Taxes on financial and capital transactions (% of GDP), OECD - 194, 27 s., 30, -0.1568 - 196, 8 s., 30, -0.2147 - 196, 52 s., 30, -0.1815
5 2, 3 / 31, 31, 0 2 / 0
- Taxes on income, profits and capital gains (% of GDP), OECD - 153, 4 s., 30, -0.0663 - 170, 4 s., 30, -0.1707 - 144, 18 s., 30, -0.1150
7 9, 7 / 34, 34, 2 3 / 2
Indirect taxes:
- Indirect Taxes (% of GDP), OECD + 137, ins., 28, 0.0239 + 136, ins., 28, 0.0271 + 147, 5 s., 28, 0.0441
5 0, 0 / 39, 39, 0 0 / 0
- Taxes on goods & services, OECD + 165, ins., 30, 0.0454 + 179, ins., 30, 0.0829 + 179, 10 s., 30, 0.0855
3 2, 2 / 46, 45, 0 3 / 0
- VAT and sales taxes (% of GDP), OECD + 160, ins., 30, 0.0433 + 179, ins., 30, 0.0830 + 173, 2 s., 30, 0.0747
4 5, 5 / 45, 45, 0 0 / 0
Corporate taxes:
- Total tax rate (% of profit), IFC + 190, 21 s., 36, 0.0865 - 166, ins., 36, -0.1221 + 134, 17 s., 36, 0.0555
176 67, 17 / 66, 66, 34 0 / 34
- Top marginal corporate tax rate, OECD et al. - 190, 27 s., 37, -0.1762 - 188, 23 s., 37, -0.2154 - 170, 28 s., 37, -0.1159
135 2, 1 / 25, 25, 6 4 / 6
- Total direct business taxes (% of GDP), OECD - 194, 12 s., 25, -0.1544 fragile, 25, -0.0236 - 149, 19 s., 25, -0.1202
32 9, 6 / 41, 41, 2 2 / 2
- Corporate taxes on income, profit & capital gains (% of GDP), OECD - 194, 6 s., 29, -0.1620 + 170, ins., 29, 0.1346 fragile, 29, 0.0043
4 60, 37 / 39, 38, 0 3 / 1
Indices of effects of tax system: 
- Fiscal freedom (inc.tax rate + corp. tax rate + total tax revenue./GDP), Heritage + 178, 6 s., 38, 0.1305 fragile, 38, 0.0328 - 142, 14 s., 38, -0.0720
177 8, 8 / 50, 50, 16 3 / 16
- Extent and effect of taxation, WEF (less distortion => higher indicator) + 168, ins., 38, 0.0269 + 171, 4 s., 38, 0.2209 + 145, 3 s., 38, 0.1011
167 18, 14 / 10, 10, 5 4 / 5
Currency holdings relative to M2  18
Note:  The sensitivity of the influence of each indicator of the tax- and social security burden was 
tested in 199 regressions using -one by one- all available variables of the list of indicators (Appendix 
1) representing the constitutional system, the complexity of tax system, the quality of administration 
and of the justice system, economic institutions including tax enforcement variables but excluding 
labor market indicators, the educational system, the innovation potential, values and moral, and other 
influences and subjective factors. The sample includes 38 OECD and Eastern European countries 
covering the period 1991-2007. Mean values are used.   
The estimated equations are of the following type: cm2ifs_m = gdprpppc_m + itstr_m + i + k, where "i" 
represents the respective tax variable and "k" represents the  respective indicator of the the list of 
other economic institutions (excluding labor market indicators) and all other influences and subjective 
factors. The inclusion of additional controls such as an indicator of inflation and of government size, 
which are consistently statistically insignificant, does not significantly influence these results.  
Meaning of the statements in the cells, in the order of their appearance: 
First row:  
Sign of estimated coefficient of the respective tax burden or fiscal indicator; number of regressions 
with this sign out of a total of 199 estimated regressions; number of regressions where the estimated 
sign is statistically significant (at least at the 10% level of significance); number of N countries (in the 
majority of all regressions); and beta coefficient (the estimated effect in standard deviation units to be 
able to directly compare the relative quantitative influence of the estimated coefficients; see also the 
ranking of the indicators of this table). 
Second row:  
OLS/WLS regressions: Number of significant Ramsey regression specification-error tests (RESET) for 
omitted variables. 
2SLS regressions:  
First value: Number of significant endogeniety tests with regard to the respective tax variable and the 
respective variable representing other influences using Wooldridge's robust score chi-squared test. 
Second value: Same as before but using the robust regression F-test. Three values behind slash give 
the number of significant tests of the validity of the instruments using, respectively, a) Sargan's chi-
squared test, b) Basman's chi square test, and c) Wooldridge's robust score test. 
GMM regressions:  
First value: Number of significant endogeniety tests using Sargan's C-statistic. 
Second value: Number of significant tests of the validity of the instruments using Hansen's J-statistic 
shi-squared test. 
Specifics of the regressions: 
OLS: Regressions estimated with robust standard errors, i.e. the estimator is robust to some types of 
misspecification so long as the observations are independent. 
2 SLS and GMM:  
The respective indicator of the tax and/or social security burden was instrumented due to its potential 
endogeniety using the following instruments: dle_m dlf_m dlg_m dlsc_m dlso_m language_m lat_m 






The evidence regarding direct personal taxes is inconsistent and thus inconclusive. Finally, there 
are several ‘specialized’ taxes with a consistently estimated negative sign, suggesting a negative 
association of these taxes with the SE, such as property taxes, taxation of interest income, financial 
and capital transactions, and corporate and business taxes. For the first three taxes the negative sign 
is robust but corporate and business taxes do not have a robust impact on the SE. 
 
The negative sign of taxation of interest income and of financial and capital transactions, which 
is robust regarding the former, is unexpected because it suggests that these taxes dampen currency 
demand and the shadow economy. It was expected that such taxes would c.p. cause capital outflows 
through exporting domestic currency and thus higher demand for currency and higher shadow 
economic activity. However, a plausible explanation is that demand deposits and/or foreign currency   19
are used in realizing capital outflows, i.e. demand for domestic currency decreases. And this effect is 
amplified by a negative impact of capital outflows on investment and output. Hence, the decreased 
demand for domestic currency in response to such taxation may be associated with capital outflows 
and reduced output. Thus, the interpretation of the negative sign of taxation is ambiguous. 
Nevertheless, the impact on domestic currency demand of these taxes is negative and robust.
10 
 
Overall it stands out that broad measures of the tax and social security burden, subsidies and other 
transfers, and government size have an estimated positive, robust impact on the SE. This points to 
the importance of the general tax burden as a potential cause for shadow economic activity rather 
than particular taxes. And the results do not support the recommendation to favor indirect taxes over 
direct taxes as part of a strategy to reduce shadow economic activities. 
 
The relative quantitative importance of the individual tax measures is shown in a ranking (table 3) 
where robust indicators were included plus selected other indicators as memorandum items.  
 
 
                                                 
10 The robust sign of our proxy for interest income taxation should be an incentive to examine deeper the 
motives behind the recently uncovered case of massive tax evasion in Germany and France through holding 
savings abroad in countries with an effective bank secrecy law (Switzerland, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein etc.). A 
former German finance minister asserted that the motive is simply that ‘people do not want to pay taxes’. This 
assumption may not be complete and a government should be interested to know which aspects of the tax 
system, other rules or causes may have contributed to such capital exports. Lawyers of those involved argued 
that often the motive was not merely to save taxes. Several others were provided: a) people’s fear of being 
expropriated through government action such as inflation, which is plausible for Germany owing to two 
hyperinflations in the last century; b) the hiding of funds from business partners, and c) inheritances of formerly 
not declared savings. But the motives may also be related to specifics of the tax system: One such element is 
that tax payers may not accept the intertemporal distortion inherent in common income taxation since taxing 
savings is double taxation of formerly taxed income: comparing the life time tax burden of a person consuming 
all his income and a person who is saving, the latter has a higher tax burden although savings enable 
investment and growth. And/or taxpayers may not accept taxation of nominal interest income instead of real 
interest income (formerly mostly at the personal tax rate, and owing to the move to dual taxation of capital and 
labor income increasingly at flat rates of 20 to 30 percent). This is taxation of substance and thus slow capital 
expropriation if the interest return after deducting the tax is lower than the inflation rate, where inflation is also a 
government tax.  
Hence, there are important motives for tax evasion of interest income caused by governments. The move to 
dual taxation and moderate capital income tax rates can thus mitigate the problem but it distorts the financial 
structure of firms. The via regia (best solution) would be the move to a neutral corporate and personal income 
tax within a simplified tax system (e.g. Boadway and Bruce, 1984; Nguyen and Rose, 2004; Rose and Petersen, 
2004). There are governments who understand this: the first OECD country going in this direction by introducing 
recently an allowance for corporate equity was Belgium (Gerard, 2006).   20
Table 3
Ranking of indicators of the tax and social security burden in increasing the shadow economy 1/
Average beta
Indicator coefficient Rank 
- Social security contributions employers (% of GDP), OECD 0.5143 1
- Customs and import duties  (% of GDP), OECD   0.3704 2
- Subsidies and other transfers (% of expense), WDI 0.3647 3
- Taxes on international trade (% of GDP), Fraser 0.3271 4
- Subsidies (% of GDP), OECD 0.3098 5
- Tax wedge incl. soc.sec. (aver. rate; aver. of all income and family types; in %), OECD 0.3058 6
- Transfers & subsidies (% of GDP), Fraser  (less subs../transf. => higher indicator value) -0.2991 7
- Tax wedge (marginal rate; two-earner married couple, 0.2675 8
- Tax wedge (average rate; two-earner married couple,  0.2659 9
- Government size, Fraser (smaller size => higher indicator value) -0.2256 10
- Taxation of nominal interest income (dummy), own -0.2224 11
- Employees’ social security  contributions (average rate; two-earner married couple) OECD 0.2117 12
- Tax and social security burden (% of GDP), OECD 0.2108 13
- Tax wedge (marginal rate; average of all income and family types; in %), OECD 0.1955 14
- Government size, Heritage  (smaller size => higher indicator vale) -0.1765 16
- Top marginal corporate tax rate, OECD et al. -0.1692 18
- Total tax revenue (% of GDP), OECD 0.1630 19
Memorandum items 2/:
- Total direct taxes (% of GDP), OECD -0.1942 15
- Social security contributions labor (% of GDP), OECD 0.1764 17
- Total receipts general government (% of GDP), OECD 0.1389 20
- Tax wedge (marginal rate; single person at 167% of av. earnings, no child), OECD 0.1358 21
- Extent and effect of taxation, WEF (less distortion => higher indicator) 0.1163 22
- Taxes on goods & services, OECD 0.0713 23
- VAT and sales taxes (% of GDP), OECD 0.0670 24
- Indirect Taxes (% of GDP), OECD 0.0317 25
1/ Ranking based on the quantitative importance of the indicators as measured by the average beta coefficient (absolute value)
 of the respective OLS, 2SLS, and GMM estimations. Only indicators with consistently estimated signs and positive impact on
 the shadow economy were included. The beta coefficient (<1) represents the estimated average change in standard deviation 
units. A beta coefficient of  0.5 means that every time the independent variable changes by one standard deviation, the shadow 
economy variable changes by half a standard deviation, on average.
2/ Indicators not robust according to the used definition.
Source: Own estimates.    21
4.2  Labor market characteristics 
 
Table 4 presents the results for the labor market indicators. Each cell summarizes the results of 200 
regressions and, as before, the robust results were highlighted and the same notation was used.  
 
Starting with the most difficult issue of labor market regulation, the three indicators of overall labor 
market regulation (LMR) all point in the same direction, namely that higher LMR increases the 
shadow economy or, in other words, higher labor market flexibility reduces the SE. Of the three 
indices, the World Bank rigidity index of Rama and Artecoma (2002) is relatively highly statistically 
significant and robust. This result of a positive association between LMR and the shadow economy is 
intuitively plausible and confirms both the older and young theories of LMR (see the summary in table 
1 above, main category 5, subgroup labor market regulation).  
 
Which of the detailed labor market characteristics (the subgroups of labor market regulation in table 1) 
are causing this result? The Fraser overall index has six elements: mandated cost of worker 
dismissal, flexibility of wage determination, hiring and firing regulations, mandated cost of hiring, 
minimum wage, and length of military conscription. The first two have estimated statistically significant 
signs in opposite direction than overall LMR. This means that the other four elements are driving the 
estimated positive association between overall LMR and the shadow economy, i.e. hiring and firing 
regulations, mandated cost of hiring, minimum wage, and length of military conscription. Hence, 
strictly according to the statistical results, allowing for more flexibility regarding these characteristics 
would tend to reduce the shadow economy.
11 
 
However, regarding policy conclusions, four issues need to be considered:  
First, the results pertain to averages and the countries differ in the details of their labor market 
regulations. Deregulating one or more elements will have effects on indicators in the other groups of 
institutions that influence the shadow economy. For instance, if one would deregulate the hiring and 
firing rules, one would probably raise the short run social assistance for unemployed, i.e. the 
replacement rate for the initial phase of unemployment, as, for instance, Denmark has done. Since 
this indicator influences the shadow economy positively (see table 4), some of the SE reducing effect 
would be offset. In the case of Denmark, where the shadow economy is miniscule, this feedback 
effect is negligible. But countries differ and Denmark has special characteristics which can explain to 
a large extent the very low shadow economy, in particular, the relatively high quality and quantity of 
public services, as shown below.  
Second, for countries with a relatively high degree of labor market flexibility (e.g. USA, Mexico) this 
finding is of little help, because even if they would raise the degree of labor market flexibility further, 
the resulting reduction in the shadow economy would tend to be small.  
Third, the quantitative impact of labor market liberalization in reducing the SE can be very different 
among the countries. Hence, each country would need to analyze further in what respect and in which 
combination with other measures labor market liberalization may in fact contribute to reducing the SE.  
 
Notwithstanding these qualifications, the estimated quantitative impact of labor market indicators 
ranks relatively high in table 5, taking the places 5, 7, 9, 13, 14, and 15. It means that LMR comes in 
third place following the unemployment indicators, and labor force participation rates and disregarding 
for a moment employee participation rights and trade union membership.  
                                                 
11 Two indicators, mandated cost of hiring and minimum wage, are, however, not included in table 4 because of 
breaks in the series, and length of military conscription was not considered.   22
Table 4
Summary of Estimation results
Influence of labor market organization on the shadow economy: Cross-section regression results: each cell represents 200 regressions.
Shadow Economy proxied by estimated currency holdings relative to M2 (cm2ifs).
Indicator OLS 2SLS GMM
Overall indices:
- Labor freedom, Heritage  (more "freedom" => higher indicator value) - 177, 1 s., 38, -0.0559 - 193, 28 s., 38, -0.2475 - 194, 163 s., 38, -0.3475
152 130, 78 / 13, 13, 5 67 / 5
- Labor market regulations, Fraser; (more flexibility => higher indicator value) - 173, 11 s., 38, -0.0573 - 168, 1 s., 38, -0.0644 - 163, 19 s., 38, -0.0908
164 7, 8 / 36, 36, 15 5 / 15
- Labor market rigidity index, Rama, Artecona (2002) + 199, 111 s., 29, 0.2325 + 195, 61 s., 29, 0.3113 + 178, 59 s., 29, 0.2053
147 1, 1 / 156, 156, 41 2 / 41
Unemployment:
- Unemployment rate , OECD + 199, 141 s., 38, 0.2454 + 178, 63 s., 38, 0.3649 + 175, 57 s., 38, 0.2344
151 9, 7 / 15, 15, 8 3 / 8
- Long term unemployment (% of labor force), OECD + 200, 2 s., 30, 0.1861 fragile, 30, 0.0076 - 147, 1 s., 30, -0.0823
24 7, 5 / 37, 37, 0 22 / 0
- Discouraged workers (% of  labor force) , OECD + 195, 4 s., 17, 0.1944 fragile, 17, 0.0000 fragile, 17, 0.1077
19 19, 0 / 7, 10, 1 5 / 0
      - male  + 196, 15 s., 16, 0.2836 fragile, 16, 0.0304 + 173, 64 s., 16, 0.4665
6 18, 0 / 22, 36, 0 2 / 2
      - female + 197, 16 s., 17, 0.2756 fragile, 17, 0.2525 + 179, 81 s., 17, 0.3738
7 20, 0 / 2, 7, 3 18 / 4
- Non-employment rate: (= 15 - 65 years old - employment)/ 15 – 65 y.o.), OECD + 200, 106 s., 30, 0.2572 fragile, 30, 0.0226 fragile, 30, -0.0095
23 46, 42 / 42, 43, 4 28 / 4
- Vulnerable employment 1/ (% of total employment) , WDI - 200, 177 s., 28, -0.4312 - 200, 174 s., 28, -0.5109 - 196, 178 s., 28, -0.4466
46 19, 6 / 4, 4, 33 3 / 32
Participation rates:
- Labor force participation rate, OECD  + 200, 200 s., 30, 0.2817 + 200, 4 s., 30, 0.3120 + 200, 58 s., 30, 0.2607
9 0, 0 / 30, 30, 3 0 / 3
- Female participation rate, Rama, Artecona (2002) + 184, 26 s., 36, 0.1270 + 196, 36 s., 36, 0.2313 + 180, 26 s., 36, 0.1170
138 64, 102 / 13, 12, 11 1 / 11
- Male participation rate, Rama, Artecona (2002) fragile, 36, -0.0003 - 189, 12 s., 36, -0.1579 - 199, 119 s., 36, -0.2218
160 42, 35 / 28, 28, 2 112 / 2
Hiring and firing: 
- Hiring and firing practices, WEF; (more determined by employer => higher value) - 195, 1 s., 38, -0.0767 fragile, 38, 0.0175 - 167, 6 s., 38, -0.1018
168 6, 5 / 42, 40, 9 1 / 9
- Mandated cost of worker dismissal, Fraser; (lower cost => higher value) + 199, 59 s., 36, 0.2225 + 199, 103 s., 36, 0.3099 + 190, 151 s., 36, 0.2773
175 8, 5 / 41, 41, 6 1 / 6
Wage determination:
- Flexibility of wage determination, WEF (more flexibility => higher indicator value) + 164, ins., 38, 0.0360 + 188, 6 s., 38, 0.1520 + 162, 18 s., 38, 0.1058
164 27, 27 / 18, 17, 7 5 / 7
Remuneration:
- Degree of pay related to worker productivity, WEF + 171, ins., 38, 0.0629 + 190, 5 s., 38, 0.1373 fragile, 38, 0.0359
160 25, 24 / 18, 17, 26 1 / 26
Participation rights:
- Employee’s participation rights, ETUI + 187, 22 s., 38, 0.1140 + 199, 141 s., 38, 0.3016 + 199, 181 s., 38, 0.3235
149 107, 44 / 11, 11, 3 17 / 3
Unionization:
- Trade union members (% of employees), OECD + 160, 1 s., 30, 0.0407 + 172, ins., 30, 0.0727 + 171, 20 s., 30, 0.0796
3 0, 0 / 36, 36, 1 1 / 1
- Total trade union membership, Rama, Artecona (2002) + 199, 29 s., 32, 0.1807 + 195, 27 s., 32, 0.1816 + 189, 34 s., 32, 0.1414
20 0, 3 / 62, 60, 43 5 / 42
Replacement rates:
- Replacement Rate for long term unemploym. (average net rate in %), OECD - 160, 11 s., 29, -0.0747 + 176, 6 s., 29, 0.1617 + 142, 14 s., 29, 0.1269
6 134, 126 / 26, 26, 1 48 / 1
- Replacement Rate for initial phase of unempl. (average net rate in %), OECD + 169, ins., 29, 0.0493 + 188, 9 s., 29, 0.1841 + 192, 75 s., 29, 0.2291
11 9, 7 / 24, 24, 0 3 / 0
Labor market programs:
- Active labor market program expenditures (% of GDP), OECD + 160, 17 s., 28, 0.0777 fragile, 28, -0.0529 fragile, 28, 0.0019
11 27, 31 / 36, 35, 5 3 / 5
- Education/training expenditures for unemployed (% of GDP), OECD + 183, 39 s., 28, 0.1359 fragile, 28, 0.0007 + 150, 29 s., 28, 0.0682
10 39, 27 / 40, 40, 0 20 / 0
Strikes and lock-outs:
- Number per year, Rama, Artecona (2002) + 156, ins., 29, 0.0194 - 197, 6 s., 29, -0.2688 - 196, 28 s., 29, -0.2893
112 60, 34 / 158, 156, 85 21 / 85
- Workdays lost, Rama, Artecona (2002) + 187, 104 s., 29, 0.1541 + 146, 9 s., 29, 0.1311 + 142, 12 s., 29, 0.0847
126 12, 11 / 186, 186, 84 6 / 84
Currency holdings relative to M2  23
1/ Vulnerable employment is unpaid family workers and own-account workers as a percentage of 
employment. 
Note:  The sensitivity of the influence of each labor market variable was tested in 200 regressions 
using -one by one- all available variables of our list of indicators (Appendix 1) representing the 
constitutional system, the complexity of tax system, the quality of administration and of the justice 
system, economic institutions including tax enforcement variables but excluding labor market 
indicators, the educational system, the innovation potential, values and moral, and other influences 
and subjective factors. The sample includes 38 OECD and Eastern European countries covering the 
period 1991-2007. Mean values are used.  In case of indicators with similar meaning published by 
different institutions and where one is based to some extent on the other, an attempt was made to use 
only the original source variable. The estimated equations are of the following type: cm2ifs_m = 
gdprpppc_m + itstr_m + i + k, where i represents the respective labor market indicator and k 
represents the respective indicator of the list of other economic institutions (excluding labor market 
indicators) and all other influences and subjective factors. The inclusion of additional controls such as 
an indicator of inflation and of government size, which are consistently statistically insignificant, does 
not significantly influence these results. Relatively highly significant results are shaded. 
Meaning of the statements in the cells, in the order of their appearance: 
First row: 
Sign of estimated coefficient of the respective labor market indicator; number of regressions with this 
sign out of a total of 200 estimated regressions; number of regressions where the estimated sign is 
statistically significant (at least at the 10% level of significance); number of N countries (in the majority 
of all regressions); and beta coefficient (the estimated effect in standard deviation units to be able to 
directly compare the relative quantitative influence of the estimated coefficients; see also the ranking 
of the indicators of this table). 
Second row:    
OLS regressions: Number of significant Ramsey regression specification-error tests (RESET) for 
omitted variables.   
2SLS regressions:    
First value: Number of significant endogeniety tests with regard to the respective labor market 
variable and the respective variable representing other influences using Wooldridge's robust score 
chi-squared test. Second value: Same as before but using the robust regression F-test. Three values 
behind slash give the number of significant tests of the validity of the instruments using, respectively, 
a) Sargan's chi-squared test, b) Basman's chi square test, and c) Wooldridge's robust score test. 
GMM regressions:    
First value: Number of significant endogeniety tests using Sargan's C-statistic. Second value behind 
slash: Number of significant tests of the validity of the instruments using Hansen's J-statistic shi-
squared test. 
Specifics of the regressions: 
OLS: Regressions estimated with robust standard errors, i.e. the estimator is robust to some types of 
misspecification so long as the observations are independent.   
2 SLS and GMM: 
The labor market indicator i was instrumented due to its potential endogeniety using the following 
instruments: legal origin of country, (i.e. either british, french, german, scandinavian, or socialist), 
language, latitude, religious and ethnic fractionalization. The equations were estimated using robust 
standard errors and small sample adjustments.  
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As can be seen in table 4, the unemployment rate (OECD data) has a relatively highly statistically 
significant and robust estimated positive sign. Therefore it is top ranking in table 5 among the labor 
market indicators. In fact, this estimated sign may be considered a test of reliability of the chosen 
dependent variable because if unemployment would not have been found to be positively and 
significantly related to the shadow economy, there should be something wrong with the chosen 
indicator of the SE.  
Other measures of unemployment and the indicator ‘discouraged workers’ also have mostly a 
positive sign and apparently the gender of discouraged workers does not matter. Only in some of the 
instrumental variables regressions the signs are fragile. Since it is well known that unemployment 
statistics are manipulated to reduce the number of officially recognized unemployed, we also used the 
non-employment rate (the working age people minus employment divided by the former). However, 
it has a statistically highly significant positive impact on the SE only in the OLS regressions.  
 
A further indicator related to unemployment measures is ‘vulnerable employment’, defined as 
unpaid family workers and own-account workers as a percentage of employment. It is the first ranking 
labor market indicator in table 5. Its estimated sign is consistently negative and highly significant, 
which suggests that own-account working and shadow economic activity are close substitutes. In 
other words, people who work as own account workers or unpaid family workers either came formerly 
from the shadow economy or they move relatively easily to the shadow economy. This underlines the 
known and plausible policy implication, namely that facilitation of officially recognized own-account 
working and incentives to pay family workers would dampen the shadow economy.  
 
Surprisingly, the association between the labor participation rate and the shadow economy is 
robustly positive. It ranks on the third place (table 5). This positive association has an interesting 
background: As shown in table 4, the male and the female participation rates of Rama and Artecona 
(2002) have estimated opposite signs, namely positive for females and negative for males. This would 
suggest that the estimated positive impact of the overall participation rate comes from female 
participation, which would be consistent with the empirical evidence of females facing disadvantages 
at the official labor market and therefore may turn more easily to unofficial activity. The policy 
conclusion would be that policies aiming at equal opportunities for woman or affirmative action for 
woman regarding their hiring would reduce the SE.  
 
Turning to the indicators employee participation rights and trade union membership, great care 
must be taken not to misinterpret the estimated positive signs: As seen in the theoretical overview, it 
can be argued that labor participation rights slow down management decisions and result in higher 
costs, less competitiveness of enterprises, and both higher unemployment and shadow economic 
activity than otherwise. However, the overwhelming part of the empirical literature on this issue, 
namely usually individual country studies, does not find significant negative but rather positive effects 
of labor participation rights on economic performance, for instance, on productivity (e.g. Fitzroy and 
Kraft, 2005). The index of employee participation rights used here is the first attempt to condense the 
available information on these rights in the 38 countries of this study (see the publications of the 
European Trade Union Institute, ETUI, in Brussels), in an index on a scale with merely 3 units. This is 
the first time a cross section index has been constructed. Labor participation rights differ highly 
among the countries, are a very complex issue due to the many facets involved, and even when there 
are no formal rights, the degree of effective labor participation may be higher than in countries with 
such rights given that they are difficult to be enforced and can be undermined. Hence, further work on 
this index is required to increase its reliability. 
 
The theoretical expectation regarding the trade union membership is also ambiguous because, on 
the one hand, it could contribute to better labor-management relations, higher productivity and even in 
wage demands that consider labor unit costs and thereby contributing to a high employment level and 
less shadow economy. On the other hand, it could contribute to wage demands that result in rising 
unit labor costs and unemployment, and thus a higher SE, although we find this theory at adds with 
the experience of several countries with a relatively high degree of trade union membership who did 
not have such adverse experiences. The estimated consistently positive signs of the two indicators of    25
Table 5
Ranking of indicators of labor market organization in influencing the shadow economy 1/
Average beta 
Indicator coefficient Rank 
- Vulnerable employment 2/ (% of total employment) , WDI -0.4629 1
- Discouraged workers (% of  labor force) , OECD, female 0.3006 2
- Labor force participation rate, OECD  0.2848 3
- Unemployment rate, OECD 0.2816 4
- Mandated cost of worker dismissal, Fraser; (lower cost => higher value) 0.2699 5
- Discouraged workers (% of  labor force), OECD, male 0.2602 6
- Labor market rigidity index, Rama, Artecona (2002) 0.2497 7
- Employee’s participation rights, ETUI 0.2464 8
- Labor freedom, Heritage  (more "freedom" => higher indicator value) -0.2170 9
- Replacement rate for initial phase of unemploym. (average net rate in %), OECD 0.1542 11
- Workdays lost, Rama, Artecona (2002) 0.1233 12
Memorandum items 3/:
- Total trade union membership, Rama, Artecona (2002) 0.1679 10
- Flexibility of wage determination, WEF (more flexibility => higher indicator value) 0.0979 13
- Degree of pay related to worker productivity, WEF 0.0787 14
- Labor market regulations, Fraser; (more flexibility => higher indicator value) -0.0708 15
- Education/training expenditures for unemployed (% of GDP), OECD 0.0683 16
- Trade union members (% of employees), OECD 0.0643 17
1/ Ranking based on the quantitative importance of the indicators as measured by the average beta coefficient (absolute
 value)  of the respective OLS, 2SLS, and GMM estimations. Only indicators with consistently estimated signs and
 positive impact on  the shadow economy were included. The beta coefficient (<1) represents the estimated average
 change in standard deviation units.
2/Vulnerable employment is unpaid family workers and own-account workers as a percentage of employment. No 
data available for important countries, e.g. Canada, all scandinavian countries, UK, USA.
3/ Indicators not robust according to the used definition.




trade union membership are therefore unexpected, However, they are mostly statistically insignificant 
(table 4), so that we cannot corroborate either hypothesis.  
 
The three remaining labor market indicators are replacement rates for the unemployed, labor 
market programs and labor conflicts. It is often hypothesized that the effect of replacement rates on 
the SE is positive due to some misuse of social assistance. Table 4 shows that, indeed, there is some 
evidence for this, particularly regarding short-term unemployment. One explanation could be that 
despite higher incentives to work in the SE during long-term unemployment owing to lower 
unemployment benefits, the incentive is there to use relatively high short-term unemployment benefits 
as a supplement to unofficial income and then turn back to official employment when short-term 
unemployment benefits end.  
 
The result for labor market programs is unexpected because the estimated sign is mostly positive, 
albeit not robust. If labor market programs would fulfill their goal, the sign should be significantly 
negative. Hence, this evidence should be taken as a call to improve these programs. 
 
The last indicator concerns labor conflicts and shows that workdays lost are clearly contributing to 
the SE. Thus, policies aiming at mitigating such conflicts would reduce the SE. 
 
Comparing the quantitative impact of the labor market indicators (table 5) with that of the tax 
indicators (table 3), shows that the latter have a somewhat higher average impact. The impact is,   26
however, even stronger regarding some of the following other institutional characteristics and 
subjective factors, most notably corruption, and perhaps unsurprisingly satisfaction with life and 
feeling of happiness! 
 
4.3  Other institutional characteristics and subjective factors  
 
Most noteworthy about the analysis of the remaining potential influences on the SE
12 (167 variables in 
all, see table 6) is that the results are entirely plausible since almost all of them have the expected 
sign and the few unexpected signs can well be explained.  
 
Moreover, the estimated quantitative impact of several of these additional influences exceeds that of 
the standard causes of the SE, which are the tax-, social security-, and regulatory burden. This is 
shown by table 7, which provides a ranking of the relatively significant and robust results according to 
the definition chosen in this paper.  
 
As can be seen the top ranking influences shown in the table have considerably higher average beta 
coefficients compared to those of the tax burden and labor market characteristics shown in tables 3 
and 5, respectively. This supports the hypothesis that shadow economic activity is conditional on 
many factors other than the commonly accepted standard causes. This is crucial because these other 
factors may well have a negative impact on the shadow economy. So if former empirical studies on 
the SE argued that the consideration of only one or few potential causes of the SE (like taxes and 
regulatory burden) means that the estimated size of the SE is most likely an underestimate, this may 
not be convincing because they leave out potentially important dampening factors so that the actual 
shadow economy may also well be lower than estimated. 
 
With only one exception the signs of the robust indicators listed in tables 6 and 7 are plausible and 
consistent with theory.
13 We summarize the results by going through the subgroups to which the 
individual indices belong. The reader is asked to browse through tables 6 and 7 to find influences of 
her/his special interest and the respective estimated impact. 
 
A possible objection to these findings is that given the relatively large number of indices used in this 
study it can be an artifact if one finds several of them to have the ‘correct’ i.e. expected estimated sign 
which is relatively significant. However, table 6 shows that with few exceptions the estimated signs 
within the individual subgroups are consistent and within each subgroup several (in the case of 
corruption all) of the indicators are relatively significant and not merely a small percentage of them. 
Six subgroups did not have robust results and thus were not included in table 7, namely the 
innovation potential, religion, globalization, inequality of income, gender, and population structure.  
 
Noteworthy, in addition to the estimated quantitative impact, is the order of the ranking in table 7. 
Specifically, the administrative burden, commonly assumed to be of high importance, ranks 
substantially behind other factors. Previously, these other factors may have been thought to be of little 
or no importance for the shadow economy in wealthy countries, such as corruption, quality of the 
justice system, feeling of happiness, quality of administration, and the perception of state and 
enterprise representatives by economic agents. But these factors rank not only before taxes and the 
administrative burden but also considerably above other important influences such as tax  
                                                 
12 These are groups 4, 5 except labor market characteristics, 6, and 7 in appendix 1. 
13 The exception is the second last indicator in table 7, the desire of people for higher income equality. This sign 
is discussed below.    27
Table 6
Summary of Estimation results
Influence of selected institutional aspects, other influences and subjective factors on the shadow economy: Cross-section regression results: each cell 
represents 69 regressions as explained below  to identify significant influences.  The shadow economy is proxied by currency holdings relative to M2 (cm2ifs).
OLS 2SLS GMM
Constitutional system:
- Democratic system , Polity (more democratic => higher indicator value) fragile, 28, 0.0076 fragile, 28, -0.0151 - 52, 8 s., 28, -0.1065
24 8, 8 / 32, 31, 6 5 / 6
- Combined Polity Score, Polity + 43, 1 s., 28, 0.0204 fragile, 28, -0.0040 - 49, 7 s., 28, -0.0966
25 7, 8 / 35, 33, 6 5 / 6
- Regime Durability, Polity - 41, 2 s., 29, -0.2172 - 38, 3 s., 29, -0.1798 - 39, 21 s., 29, -0.2945
18 5, 5 / 16, 16, 0 2 / 0
- Executive Constraints, Polity (constraints for top political level => higher indicator value) fragile, 28, 0.0118 fragile, 28, 0.0021 - 42, 5 s., 28, -0.0415
25 8, 7 / 33, 33, 6 5 / 6
- Regulation of Participation, Polity fragile, 28, 0.0505 fragile, 17, -0.0116 - 28, 5 s., 17, -0.1078
30 7, 7 / 20, 20, 3 4 / 3
- Having Democratic system in Country is good, WVS (higher affirmation => higher value) + 57, 7 s., 30, 0.1006 + 57, 7 s., 30, 0.1122 + 61, 20 s., 30, 0.1537
25 9, 6 / 3, 3, 5 5 / 5
- Rule of Law, WBGI  - 66, 28 s., 30, -0.2848 - 65, 22 s., 30, -0.2944 - 67, 37 s., 30, -0.3226
25 13, 10 / 4, 4, 0 10 / 0
- Political Stability & Absence of Violence, WBGI fragile, 30, -0.0467 fragile, 30, -0.0523 - 44, 21 s., 30, -0.0939
29 7, 4 / 23, 23, 6 6 / 6
Elements of direct democracy:
- Political action signing a petition (have done), (higher affirmation => higher indicator value) - 66, 10 s., 30, -0.2092 - 64, 5 s., 30, -0.2023 - 68, 22 s., 30, -0.2327
22 10, 10 / 4, 4, 2 5 / 2
- Country is run for all people, WVS fragile, 18, -0.0633 fragile, 18, -0.0594 fragile, 18, 0.0451
32 10, 9 / 19, 18, 4 4 / 1
- Democratic accountability, ICRG - 69, 38 s., 30, -0.2716 - 69, 35 s., 30, -0.2843 - 69, 58 s., 30, -0.3153
22 12, 8 / 3, 3, 1 7 / 1
- Voice and Accountability, WBGI fragile, 30, -0.0359 fragile, 30, -0.0505 - 49, 13 s., 30, -0.1054
28 9, 8 / 5, 5, 4 10 / 4
Complexity of tax system: 
- Tax payments (number), IFC fragile, 29, 0.0666 fragile, 29, 0.0609 + 44, 7 s., 29, 0.1008
31 12, 7 / 18, 18, 6 4 / 6
- Tax payments (number), WDI + 46, 32 s., 29, 0.1789 + 47, 32 s., 29, 0.1790 + 47, 33 s., 29, 0.1781
28 11, 5 / 12, 13, 9 3 / 9
- Paying taxes (time hours), IFC  + 46, 6 s., 29, 0.1411 + 48, 5 s., 29, 0.1379 + 62, 22 s., 29, 0.1900
31 5, 4 / 13, 13, 4 2 / 4
- Cost of tax compliance for business, Fraser (lower cost => higher indicator value) - 42, 5 s., 28, -0.0906 - 47, 3 s., 28, -0.0963 - 52, 14 s., 28, -0.1073
25 3, 3 / 17, 17, 7 3 / 7
- Compliance cost of importing and exporting, Fraser (lower cost => higher indicator value) - 45, 14 s., 30, -0.1423 - 45, 12 s., 30, -0.1424 - 46, 31 s., 30, -0.1776
30 12, 9 / 5, 5, 1 7 / 1
Administrative burden
- Business regulations, Fraser (less bureaucratic cost => higher indicator value) - 66, 13 s., 30, -0.1937 - 62, 12 s., 30, -0.2003 - 66, 34 s., 30, -0.2900
23 14, 9 / 4, 4, 0 12 / 0
- Administrative requirements, Fraser (less bureaucratic cost => higher indicator value) - 60, 24 s., 30, -0.1241 - 58, 19 s., 30, -0.1377 - 67, 25 s., 30, -0.1830
26 15, 10 / 4, 4, 0 11 / 0
- Burden of government regulation, WEF (less burdensome => higher indicator value) - 62, 29 s., 30, -0.1596 - 61, 29 s., 30, -0.1673 - 66, 28 s., 30, -0.1936
26 11, 9 / 4, 4, 0 8 / 0
- Regulatory quality, WBGI (higher quality => higher indicator value) - 44, 17 s., 30, -0.1433 - 45, 17 s., 30, -0.1579 - 50, 36 s., 30, -0.2079
28 13, 8 / 6, 6, 1 8 / 1
- Bureaucratic quality, ICRG (higher quality => higher indicator value) - 68, 6 s., 30, -0.2877 - 67, 8 s., 30, -0.2887 - 69, 47 s., 30, -0.4165
28 7, 8 / 4, 4, 3 5 / 3
- Quality of Regulatory standards, WEF (more stringent => higher indicator value) - 67, 1 s., 30, -0.1309 - 63, 3 s., 30, -0.1264 - 66, 14 s., 30, -0.1983
29 9, 7 / 16, 16, 5 6 / 5
- Bureaucracy costs, Fraser (less bureaucratic cost => higher indicator value) - 43, ins., 30, -0.0501 - 44, ins., 30, -0.0358 - 52, 5 s., 30, -0.0651
23 13, 14 / 10, 10, 4 8 / 4
- Starting a business, Fraser (less burdensome => higher indicator value) - 68, 6 s., 30, -0.1912 - 63, 7 s., 30, -0.1930 - 68, 41 s., 30, -0.3173
22 11, 9 / 5, 5, 0 8 / 0
- Extra payments/bribes, Fraser (less bribes => higher indicator value) - 66, 29 s., 30, -0.2355 - 65, 25 s., 30, -0.2491 - 67, 49 s., 30, -0.3005
22 11, 8 / 2, 2, 0 7 / 0
- Business Freedom, Heritage (more "freedom" => higher indicator value) - 69, 43 s., 30, -0.3243 - 66, 43 s., 30, -0.3232 - 68, 49 s., 30, -0.3884
22 18, 13 / 21, 21, 0 6 / 0
- No. procedures start business, WEF (higher bureaucracy => higher indicator value) + 45, 11 s., 30, 0.1345 + 46, 10 s., 30, 0.1339 + 59, 36 s., 30, 0.2115
23 10, 9 / 3, 3, 5 5 / 5
- Time req. to start a business, WEF (higher bureaucracy => higher indicator value) + 67, 37 s., 29, 0.2098 + 64, 31 s., 29, 0.2018 + 68, 40 s., 29, 0.2099
23 6, 5 / 11, 11, 2 3 / 2
- No. of procedures to resolve a dispute + 56, ins., 26, 0.0572 + 55, ins., 26, 0.0623 + 48, 11 s., 26, 0.0528
30 8, 5 / 44, 44, 5 7 / 5
- Extent of bureaucratic red tape, WEF (% of worktime increases => higher indicator value) - 43, ins., 30, -0.0316 - 42, ins., 30, -0.0433 - 43, 1 s., 30, -0.0333
24 12, 13 / 9, 9, 3 7 / 3
Trade related:
- Hidden trade barriers, WEF (less barriers => higher indicator value) - 66, 4 s., 30, -0.1836 - 69, 5 s., 30, -0.1977 - 68, 23 s., 30, -0.2335
25 7, 8 / 3, 3, 3 9 / 3
- Non-tariff trade barriers, Fraser (less barriers => higher indicator value) - 66, 9 s., 30, -0.1684 - 68, 7 s., 30, -0.1805 - 67, 23 s., 30, -0.2010
24 10, 8 / 4, 5, 2 7 / 2
- Regulatory Trade Barriers, Fraser (less barriers => higher indicator value) - 63, 14 s., 30, -0.1735 - 66, 10 s., 30, -0.1861 - 64, 22 s., 30, -0.2092
26 8, 8 / 4, 4, 2 8 / 2
- Trade freedom, Heritage (more  "freedom" => higher indicator value) - 43, 31 s., 30, -0.1948 - 44, 28 s., 30, -0.1837 - 48, 33 s., 30, -0.2623
26 9, 8 / 5, 5, 4 8 / 4
Quality of administration: 
- Government Effectiveness, WBGI - 69, 27 s., 30, -0.3126 - 68, 22 s., 30, -0.3327 - 68, 46 s., 30, -0.3533
23 10, 7 / 3, 3, 1 9 / 1
- Control of Corruption, WBGI - 69, 33 s., 30, -0.3418 - 69, 35 s., 30, -0.3601 - 69, 48 s., 30, -0.3605
22 10, 6 / 3, 3, 0 10 / 0
- Efficiency of legal framework, WEF (more efficient => higher indicator value) - 69, 18 s., 30, -0.2701 - 69, 14 s., 30, -0.2842 - 68, 42 s., 30, -0.3159
22 13, 9 / 1, 1, 1 12 / 1
- Irregular payments in public utilities, WEF (less irregularity => higher indicator value)  - 46, 31 s., 30, -0.2138 - 47, 24 s., 30, -0.2099 - 54, 40 s., 30, -0.2743
29 11, 8 / 4, 4, 0 8 / 0
- Irregular payments in tax collection, WEF (less irreg. => higher indicator value) - 67, 3 s., 30, -0.1702 - 64, 4 s., 30, -0.1714 - 63, 22 s., 30, -0.2166
24 10, 8 / 4, 4, 0 7 / 0
- Irreg. paym. in public contracts, WEF (less irreg. => higher indicator value) - 67, 35 s., 30, -0.3039 - 67, 30 s., 30, -0.3077 - 68, 53 s., 30, -0.3449
25 11, 7 / 3, 3, 1 7 / 1
Currency holdings relative to M2
   28
Quality of justice system:
- Irreg. paym. in judicial decisions, WEF (less irreg. => higher indicator value) - 69, 27 s., 30, -0.3160 - 69, 28 s., 30, -0.3188 - 69, 51 s., 30, -0.3560
27 12, 9 / 3, 3, 0 6 / 0
- Judicial independence, WEF (higher independence => higher indicator value) - 69, 39 s., 30, -0.3784 - 69, 37 s., 30, -0.3871 - 69, 60 s., 30, -0.3767
26 14, 9 / 1, 1, 0 15 / 0
- Integrity of the legal system, Fraser (higher integrity => higher indicator value) - 69, 43 s., 30, -0.3397 - 69, 38 s., 30, -0.3512 - 69, 56 s., 30, -0.3603
25 12, 9 / 2, 2, 1 7 / 1
- Impartial courts, Fraser (higher impartiality => higher indicator value) - 69, 17 s., 30, -0.2651 - 69, 17 s., 30, -0.2811 - 68, 42 s., 30, -0.3094
22 13, 10 / 1, 1, 0 9 / 0
- Bribes for influencing laws, policies, regulations, decrees, WEF (less bribes =>higher value) - 66, 10 s., 30, -0.1969 - 65, 6 s., 30, -0.1992 - 65, 29 s., 30, -0.2383
24 11, 8 / 5, 5, 1 5 / 1
- Confidence in justice system, WVS - 62, 23 s., 30, -0.1399 - 59, 20 s., 30, -0.1341 - 52, 20 s., 30, -0.1145
25 12, 10 / 10, 10, 3 7 / 3
Economic Institutions
- Protection of property rights, Fraser - 69, 9 s., 30, -0.2674 - 69, 7 s., 30, -0.2757 - 69, 41 s., 30, -0.3222
23 9, 7 / 3, 3, 0 9 / 0
- Protection of property rights, Heritage - 69, 31 s., 30, -0.3634 - 69, 32 s., 30, -0.3778 - 69, 49 s., 30, -0.3886
20 12, 10 / 1, 1, 0 5 / 0
- Protection of property rights, WEF - 65, 13 s., 30, -0.2277 - 59, 11 s., 30, -0.2302 - 65, 38 s., 30, -0.3019
23 11, 7 / 6, 6, 0 7 / 0
- Intellectual property rights - 69, 10 s., 30, -0.2905 - 69, 10 s., 30, -0.2994 - 69, 37 s., 30, -0.3076
22 5, 5 / 3, 3, 0 5 / 0
- Regulation of entry (=contract law, legal formalism), IFC (higher cost => higher value) + 45, 41 s., 28, 0.2203 + 45, 40 s., 28, 0.2367 + 62, 33 s., 28, 0.2565
26 9, 6 / 21, 21, 5 4 / 5
- Number of legal procedures to collect an unpaid check (contract law, legal formalism), IFC + 44, 31 s., 28, 0.1265 + 47, 31 s., 28, 0.1361 + 66, 42 s., 28, 0.2222
  (higher cost => higher value) 39 5, 2 / 39, 39, 3 3 / 3
- Enforcing contracts (days), IFC (higher effort => higher value) fragile, 27, -0.0105 fragile, 27, -0.0104 fragile, 27, 0.0518
24 9, 9 / 44, 43, 3 2 / 3
- Legal enforcement contracts, Fraser (lower cost => higher value) - 43, 5 s., 28, -0.0645 - 42, 4 s., 28, -0.0607 fragile, 28, -0.1366
27 8, 4 / 37, 38, 7 3 / 7
- Auditing & Reporting Standards, WEF ("stronger" => higher indicator value) - 67, 37 s., 30, -0.2709 - 63, 31 s., 30, -0.2786 - 68, 43 s., 30, -0.3245
24 14, 12 / 2, 2, 0 5 / 0
- Investor protection index, IFC (better protection => higher indicator value) - 69, 66 s., 29, -0.2965 - 69, 62 s., 29, -0.3018 - 69, 68 s., 29, -0.3240
23 11, 8 / 3, 3, 0 1 / 0
      - Disclosure index - 69, 28 s., 29, -0.2074 - 69, 30 s., 29, -0.2162 - 68, 44 s., 29, -0.2140
25 10, 8 / 12, 12, 5 2 / 5
      - Director Liability index - 69, 66 s., 29, -0.2786 - 69, 60 s., 29, -0.2744 - 69, 62 s., 29, -0.2748
19 3, 2 / 2, 2, 3 3 / 3
- Intensity of local competition, WEF (higher intensity => higher indicator value) - 53, 1 s., 30, -0.0735 - 52, ins., 30, -0.0728 - 48, 16 s., 30, -0.0913
25 8, 9 / 12, 12, 4 6 / 4
- Investment Freedom, Heritage (more "freedom" => higher indicator value) + 52, 3 s., 30, 0.0724 + 53, 3 s., 30, 0.0715 + 43, 16 s., 30, 0.0518
25 10, 6 / 5, 5, 3 8 / 3
- Monetary Freedom, Heritage (more "freedom" => higher indicator value) - 44, 11 s., 30, -0.1259 - 47, 10 s., 30, -0.1227 - 49, 10 s., 30, -0.1442
28 12, 11 / 7, 7, 2 5 / 2
- Financial Freedom, Heritage (more "freedom" => higher indicator value) - 45, ins., 30, -0.0458 - 48, 1 s., 30, -0.0436 - 48, 11 s., 30, -0.0652
25 10, 10 / 5, 5, 4 6 / 4
Tax enforcement:
a) Probability of tax fraud detection
- Tax administration expenditure (in % of GDP), OECD + 47, ins., 21, 0.0375 + 44, ins., 21, 0.0420 - 54, 10 s., 21, -0.0826
4 10, 10 / 9, 12, 0 3 / 0
- Tax administration staff per taxpayer, OECD - 61, 30 s., 29, -0.1217 fragile, 29, 0.0000 - 60, 35 s., 29, -0.1224
24 9, 5 / 13, 13, 2 3 / 0
- Tax auditors per taxpayer, in o/oo, OECD - 68, 23 s., 27, -0.1562 fragile, 27, 0.0000 - 67, 39 s., 27, -0.2146
  4 4, 4 / 32, 31, 0 0 / 0
- Verification activities per taxpayer, OECD + 69, 25 s., 27, 0.1834 + 68, 13 s., 27, 0.1787 + 65, 32 s., 27, 0.1967
8 15, 13 / 12, 13, 9 8 / 9
- Number of citizens per tax administration staff, OECD + 62, 12 s., 30, 0.0834 + 57, 12 s., 30, 0.0952 + 61, 25 s., 30, 0.1071
26 9, 7 / 4, 4, 6 6 / 6
- Police per 100th. population, Eurostat + 64, 4 s., 28, 0.1373 + 64, 6 s., 28, 0.1471 + 68, 19 s., 28, 0.1976
32 11, 12 / 11, 11, 4 5 / 4
b) Punishment 
- Number prisoners (per 100 th. population), Eurostat + 69, 57 s., 28, 0.2532 + 69, 57 s., 28, 0.2602 + 69, 54 s., 28, 0.2563
28 14, 13 / 29, 29, 7 10 / 7
Educational system
- Public spending on education, total (% of GDP), WDI + 48, ins., 30, 0.0360 fragile, 30, 0.0664 fragile, 30, 0.0438
29 16, 12 / 7, 7, 7 10 / 7
- School enrollment, secondary  (% gross), WDI - 67, 12 s., 30, -0.1396 - 69, 12 s., 30, -0.1458 - 69, 25 s., 30, -0.1621
24 9, 9 / 4, 4, 3 6 / 3
- School enrollment, tertiary (% gross), WDI fragile, 29, 0.0068 fragile, 29, 0.0034 - 43, 3 s., 29, -0.0313
28 11, 10 / 28, 28, 3 5 / 3
Innovation potential
- ICT expenditure (% of GDP), WDI - 69, 14 s., 27, -0.2644 - 69, 14 s., 27, -0.2623 - 69, 53 s., 27, -0.3049
7 6, 6 / 45, 45, 8 0 / 8
- R&D. expenditure (% of GDP), WDI - 48, 1 s., 30, -0.0624 - 46, 2 s., 30, -0.0543 - 52, 9 s., 30, -0.0765
26 11, 9 / 9, 8, 3 2 / 3
- R&D. exp. (% of GNI), WEF fragile, 28, -0.0267 fragile, 28, -0.0239 - 45, 6 s., 28, -0.0511
27 4, 1 / 39, 39, 3 1 / 3
- Technological sophistication, WEF - 65, ins., 30, -0.0965 - 57, ins., 30, -0.0913 - 64, 4 s., 30, -0.1435
24 10, 9 / 5, 5, 0 6 / 0
- Company Spending on R&D, WEF fragile, 30, -0.0206 fragile, 30, -0.0213 - 52, 3 s., 30, -0.0675
26 12, 9 / 4, 4, 3 7 / 3
- University/Industry collaboration, WEF - 67, 3 s., 30, -0.1511 - 67, 3 s., 30, -0.1571 - 64, 24 s., 30, -0.1869
27 8, 7 / 4, 4, 2 4 / 2  29
Values/Moral
Social Capital, social norms:
- Trust other people in country, WVS (higher affirmation => higher indicator value) - 63, 3 s., 25, -0.1095 - 62, 4 s., 25, -0.1263 - 68, 20 s., 25, -0.1893
28 8, 9 / 0, 0, 0 4 / 0
- Accepting a bribe justifiable, WVS (higher affirmation => higher value) + 46, 3 s., 30, 0.0948 + 46, 3 s., 30, 0.1005 + 46, 23 s., 30, 0.1314
23 7, 7 / 17, 17, 16 5 / 16
- Justifiable: claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled, WVS  - 50, 6 s., 30, -0.0555 - 46, 5 s., 30, -0.0576 fragile, 30, -0.0188
   (higher affirmation => higher value) 28 5, 5 / 24, 23, 14 6 / 14
- Justifiable: avoiding fare on public transport, WVS (higher affirmation => higher value)  + 45, ins., 30, 0.0601 + 45, ins., 30, 0.0607 + 45, 5 s., 30, 0.0742
23 10, 9 / 11, 10, 12 6 / 12
- Impact of nepotism, WEF (less influence => higher indicator value)  - 69, 38 s., 30, -0.2429 - 68, 31 s., 30, -0.2500 - 69, 41 s., 30, -0.2584
33 14, 10 / 20, 20, 5 7 / 5
Tax moral:
- Cheating on taxes justifiable, WVS (higher affirmation => higher value)  fragile, 30, -0.0111 - 45, 1 s., 30, -0.0125 fragile, 30, 0.0013
26 7, 5 / 5, 5, 15 5 / 15
Other moral aspects:
- Family important in life, WVS (higher affirmation => higher value)  - 59, 25 s., 30, -0.1774 - 61, 23 s., 30, -0.1749 - 49, 25 s., 30, -0.1505
29 6, 5 / 5, 5, 4 8 / 4
- Spend time with friends, WVS (higher affirmation => higher value)  - 66, 33 s., 26, -0.2639 - 68, 28 s., 26, -0.2608 - 65, 41 s., 26, -0.2700
26 8, 6 / 1, 1, 3 2 / 3
- Belong to labor unions , WVS (higher affirmation => higher value)  + 60, 1 s., 28, 0.1075 + 63, 6 s., 28, 0.1467 fragile, 28, 0.0391
24 14, 11 / 5, 5, 1 8 / 1
- Belong to political parties , WVS (higher affirmation => higher value)  + 68, 8 s., 28, 0.1652 + 66, 4 s., 28, 0.1647 + 64, 11 s., 28, 0.1411
11 15, 12 / 4, 4, 1 3 / 1
- Belong to none, WVS (higher affirmation => higher value)  - 50, ins., 26, -0.0484 - 51, ins., 26, -0.0533 fragile, 26, 0.0219
9 11, 7 / 3, 3, 0 6 / 0
- Income equality (should be made more equal), WVS (higher affirmation => higher value)  - 60, 24 s., 29, -0.1168 - 59, 22 s., 29, -0.1205 - 58, 24 s., 29, -0.1060
29 5, 4 / 4, 4, 4 4 / 4
- Importance of eliminating big income inequalities, WVS (higher affirmation => higher value)  - 54, 6 s., 22, -0.0753 - 51, 6 s., 22, -0.0835 - 52, 11 s., 22, -0.1028
16 13, 6 / 4, 4, 3 10 / 3
- Govt. should take more responsibility, WVS (higher affirmation => higher value)  + 50, ins., 30, 0.0858 + 52, 4 s., 30, 0.0935 fragile, 30, 0.0360
22 8, 7 / 7, 6, 4 5 / 4
- Govt. should be more open to public , WVS (higher affirmation => higher value)  + 59, 3 s., 23, 0.1306 + 53, 2 s., 23, 0.1038 fragile, 23, 0.0603
9 6, 4 / 35, 35, 2 4 / 1
- Govt. should allow more freedom for individuals, WVS (higher affirmation => higher value)  + 68, 23 s., 23, 0.2845 + 68, 15 s., 23, 0.2829 + 66, 29 s., 23, 0.2670
27 8, 8 / 20, 20, 0 8 / 0
- Confidence in churches, WVS (higher affirmation => higher value)  + 68, 3 s., 30, 0.1102 + 66, 3 s., 30, 0.1114 + 63, 6 s., 30, 0.1112
28 9, 5 / 42, 41, 8 4 / 8
Religion:  
- Believe in god, WVS (higher affirmation => higher value)  - 55, ins., 29, -0.0469 - 53, ins., 29, -0.0493 - 46, 1 s., 29, -0.0218
12 10, 6 / 14, 13, 2 3 / 2
- Importance of god in life, WVS fragile, 30, -0.0105 fragile, 30, -0.0180 fragile, 30, 0.0027
26 12, 8 / 18, 19, 4 4 / 4
- Religion fractionalization, WVS - 45, ins., 30, -0.0176 fragile, 0, 0.0000 fragile, 0, 0.0000
25 12, 9 / 16, 17, 7 6 / 7
- Spend time with people at church, mosque, synagogue, WVS + 54, 2 s., 24, 0.0506 + 49, ins., 24, 0.0385 + 45, 4 s., 24, 0.0596
10 13, 13 / 6, 4, 0 10 / 0
- Spend time with people at sport, culture, communal organizations, WVS - 63, ins., 25, -0.1475 - 64, ins., 25, -0.1401 - 58, 10 s., 25, -0.1431
8 6, 7 / 4, 4, 0 2 / 0
- Belong to Religious organization, WVS - 54, 3 s., 28, -0.0594 - 56, 2 s., 28, -0.0582 - 63, 5 s., 28, -0.0855
13 11, 9 / 4, 4, 0 4 / 0
Corruption:
- Corruption , TI (less corruption => higher value)  - 69, 43 s., 30, -0.3644 - 69, 39 s., 30, -0.3792 - 69, 54 s., 30, -0.3708
22 13, 8 / 3, 3, 0 7 / 0
- Extent of Political corruption, WVS (higher perceived corruption  => higher value)  + 69, 60 s., 17, 0.6713 + 69, 58 s., 17, 0.6324 + 69, 61 s., 17, 0.5341
25 14, 16 / 10, 13, 1 6 / 1
- Impact of business costs of corruption, WEF (lower impact => higher value)  - 69, 39 s., 30, -0.3433 - 69, 31 s., 30, -0.3535 - 68, 50 s., 30, -0.3617
   34 12, 8 / 2, 2, 1 7 / 1
- Reliability of bribes, WEF (higher confidence in reliabilty > higher value)  + 69, 32 s., 28, 0.2148 + 68, 32 s., 28, 0.2124 + 67, 38 s., 28, 0.2102
24 2, 1 / 22, 21, 8 2 / 8
- Freedom from Corruption, Heritage (less corruption => higher indicator value) - 69, 59 s., 30, -0.4250 - 69, 49 s., 30, -0.4361 - 69, 61 s., 30, -0.4359
24 12, 6 / 7, 7, 0 8 / 0
Other influences and subjective factors:
Quantity and quality of public goods provision:
- Quality of public schools, WEF - 55, 9 s., 30, -0.1152 - 54, 2 s., 30, -0.1166 - 63, 30 s., 30, -0.1895
27 15, 11 / 10, 10, 3 9 / 3
- Confidence in education system, WVS - 50, 1 s., 27, -0.0282 - 48, 1 s., 27, -0.0353 - 53, 2 s., 27, -0.0505
11 12, 9 / 5, 5, 0 6 / 0
- Overall infrastructure quality, WEF - 53, 4 s., 30, -0.1161 - 53, 2 s., 30, -0.1087 - 61, 12 s., 30, -0.1733
26 12, 8 / 4, 4, 1 7 / 1
- Reliability of police services, WEF - 66, 21 s., 30, -0.2421 - 68, 8 s., 30, -0.2417 - 67, 30 s., 30, -0.2806
27 11, 8 / 4, 3, 0 9 / 0
- Irregular payments in exports & imports, WEF (less irregularity => higher indicator value)  - 67, 26 s., 30, -0.2545 - 64, 22 s., 30, -0.2529 - 66, 40 s., 30, -0.3234
27 14, 7 / 4, 4, 1 7 / 1
- Differences in quality of healthcare available to rich and poor, WEF (less diff.=>higher value)  - 60, 1 s., 29, -0.0826 - 47, 1 s., 29, -0.0598 - 59, 8 s., 29, -0.1171
27 20, 15 / 46, 45, 16 3 / 16
- Confidence in social security system, WVS (higher confidence => higher indicator value)  - 65, 2 s., 27, -0.1289 - 64, 3 s., 27, -0.1315 - 61, 25 s., 27, -0.1303
14 11, 10 / 2, 2, 0 7 / 0
- Confidence in Government, WVS (higher confidence => higher indicator value)  fragile, 22, -0.0077 fragile, 22, -0.0018 + 54, 5 s., 22, 0.0439
30 11, 8 / 34, 37, 3 5 / 3
- Confidence in Parliament, WVS (higher confidence => higher indicator value)  fragile, 30, -0.0096 fragile, 30, -0.0072 fragile, 30, 0.0185
26 10, 12 / 7, 7, 6 8 / 6
- Confidence in Political Parties, WVS (higher confidence => higher indicator value)  - 54, ins., 22, -0.0547 - 50, ins., 22, -0.0494 + 44, 3 s., 22, 0.0522
32 10, 10 / 23, 24, 7 7 / 5  30
Efficiency of public goods provision:
- Wastefulness of government spending , WEF (less waste => higher indicator value)  - 56, 11 s., 30, -0.1375 - 56, 6 s., 30, -0.1458 - 65, 21 s., 30, -0.1628
25 9, 9 / 4, 4, 2 7 / 2
Quality of State representatives: 
- Competence of public officials relative to private sector, WEF (higher comp.=>higher value)  - 44, 26 s., 29, -0.1470 - 48, 21 s., 29, -0.1631 - 66, 48 s., 29, -0.2480
29 12, 7 / 8, 8, 1 3 / 1
- Satisfaction with people in national office, WVS (higher satisf. => higher indicator value)  fragile, 18, 0.0802 fragile, 18, 0.0861 + 44, 36 s., 18, 0.1509
26 11, 14 / 7, 7, 3 8 / 0
- Favoritism in decisions of government officials, WEF (less favoritism => higher value)  - 69, 54 s., 30, -0.3580 - 69, 46 s., 30, -0.3555 - 69, 62 s., 30, -0.3603
33 12, 9 / 5, 5, 1 8 / 1
- Diversion of public funds to companies etc., WEF (less diversion => higher value)  - 69, 35 s., 30, -0.3392 - 69, 31 s., 30, -0.3498 - 69, 52 s., 30, -0.3512
37 13, 9 / 0, 0, 0 8 / 0
- Public trust of politicians, WEF (more trust => higher indicator value)  - 69, 8 s., 30, -0.2074 - 66, 3 s., 30, -0.2015 - 66, 22 s., 30, -0.1976
24 11, 9 / 6, 6, 1 6 / 1
- Prevalence of illegal political donations, WEF (less prevalance => higher value)  - 69, 18 s., 30, -0.2510 - 68, 15 s., 30, -0.2402 - 68, 37 s., 30, -0.2664
22 13, 9 / 4, 4, 2 8 / 2
- Effectiveness of law-making bodies, WEF (higher effectivenss => higher value)  - 68, 38 s., 30, -0.2992 - 62, 38 s., 30, -0.2995 - 65, 45 s., 30, -0.3366
22 11, 6 / 4, 4, 1 7 / 1
- Quality of information regarding changes in policies & regulations, WEF  - 67, 40 s., 30, -0.2992 - 62, 38 s., 30, -0.3061 - 66, 45 s., 30, -0.3221
  (higher transparency => higher value)  28 16, 11 / 1, 1, 1 6 / 1
- Policy consequences of legal political donations, WEF (less influnce => higher value) - 69, 23 s., 30, -0.2372 - 68, 19 s., 30, -0.2349 - 69, 34 s., 30, -0.2310
24 12, 8 / 12, 11, 1 7 / 1
- Misuse of legal political donations, WEF (less occuring => higher indicator value) - 67, 7 s., 28, -0.2353 - 67, 7 s., 28, -0.2622 - 69, 31 s., 28, -0.2744
22 9, 6 / 25, 25, 0 4 / 0
Quality of enterprise  representatives:
- Confidence in major companies, WVS (higher confidence => higher indicator value)  - 60, 2 s., 30, -0.0571 - 57, 1 s., 30, -0.0487 fragile, 30, -0.0162
25 13, 10 / 22, 22, 16 7 / 16
- Ethical behavior of firms, WEF (better => higher indicator value)  - 69, 42 s., 30, -0.3432 - 69, 39 s., 30, -0.3540 - 69, 57 s., 30, -0.3535
22 9, 7 / 3, 3, 1 8 / 1
- Willingness to delegate authority, WEF (higher willingness => higher indicator value)  - 66, 6 s., 30, -0.1824 - 67, 3 s., 30, -0.1930 - 67, 21 s., 30, -0.2400
26 10, 8 / 4, 4, 3 7 / 3
- Extent of staff training, WEF (higher training => higher indicator value)  - 67, ins., 30, -0.1558 - 66, 1 s., 30, -0.1581 - 65, 11 s., 30, -0.2179
30 14, 13 / 5, 6, 3 7 / 3
- Cooperation in labor-employer relations, WEF (higher cooperation => higher indicator value)  fragile, 30, -0.0236 fragile, 30, -0.0219 - 45, 4 s., 30, -0.0462
26 13, 8 / 4, 4, 4 5 / 4
- Efficacy of supervisory boards, WEF (higher efficacy => higher indicator value)  - 46, 1 s., 30, -0.0980 - 49, ins., 30, -0.1136 - 51, 20 s., 30, -0.1584
24 11, 10 / 9, 8, 4 8 / 4
- Socioeconomic conditions, ICRG - 64, 32 s., 30, -0.3279 - 57, 36 s., 30, -0.3454 - 62, 39 s., 30, -0.3868
22 14, 8 / 8, 8, 0 3 / 0
- Confidence in regional organizations (e.g. EU, Nafta), WVS (higher confid. =>higher value) + 63, ins., 25, 0.0682 + 64, ins., 25, 0.0821 + 56, ins., 25, 0.0555
6 11, 8 / 14, 14, 1 7 / 1
Decentralization 
- Decentralization of economic policymaking, WEF (more decentralized => higher value) + 69, 35 s., 30, 0.2065 + 68, 33 s., 30, 0.1994 + 68, 48 s., 30, 0.2151
26 8, 6 / 28, 28, 4 6 / 4
- Regulatory obstacles to business (local vs. federal), WEF  - 68, ins., 28, -0.0798 - 62, 1 s., 28, -0.0761 - 61, 16 s., 28, -0.1045
  (obstacles more located on central level => higher indicator value) 29 5, 4 / 41, 43, 7 3 / 7
- State of cluster development (limited vs. common and deep), WEF (deep=> high value) - 59, 27 s., 30, -0.1208 - 56, 24 s., 30, -0.1080 - 55, 26 s., 30, -0.1233
27 7, 6 / 4, 4, 0 4 / 1
Crime: 
- Organized crime, WEF (less cost of crime => higher indicator value) - 69, 38 s., 30, -0.2641 - 68, 34 s., 30, -0.2650 - 69, 41 s., 30, -0.2776
33 11, 9 / 4, 4, 0 6 / 0
- Drug trafficking, Eurostat (higher activity => higher indicator value) - 53, ins., 27, -0.0818 - 55, ins., 27, -0.0884 - 63, 4 s., 27, -0.1130
22 11, 12 / 3, 3, 0 6 / 0
- Auto theft, Eurostat (higher crime => higher indicator value) - 68, 12 s., 27, -0.1990 - 68, 17 s., 27, -0.2083 - 67, 26 s., 27, -0.1885
15 13, 13 / 3, 3, 4 12 / 4
Feelings and Expectations:
- Feeling of happiness, WVS (higher affirmation => higher indicator value) - 69, 37 s., 30, -0.4950 - 69, 34 s., 30, -0.4925 - 69, 49 s., 30, -0.5137
3 5, 4 / 3, 2, 2 10 / 2
- Satisfaction with financial situation of household , WVS (higher affirmation => higher value) - 68, 6 s., 28, -0.3243 - 68, 5 s., 28, -0.3186 - 62, 19 s., 28, -0.2571
27 4, 4 / 19, 19, 3 6 / 3
- Satisfaction with your life, WVS (higher affirmation => higher indicator value) - 69, 48 s., 30, -0.4513 - 69, 46 s., 30, -0.4554 - 69, 50 s., 30, -0.4425
28 8, 6 / 4, 4, 3 6 / 3
- Economic growth expectations, WEF fragile, 30, 0.0065 fragile, 30, -0.0009 - 56, 11 s., 30, -0.1160
26 12, 9 / 25, 25, 3 7 / 3
- Interest in politics, WVS (higher affirmation => higher indicator value) + 68, 4 s., 30, 0.1385 + 67, 8 s., 30, 0.1408 + 55, 11 s., 30, 0.0777
22 11, 9 / 4, 4, 3 6 / 3
- Satisfaction with the way democracy develops, WVS (higher affirmation => higher value) - 56, ins., 26, -0.0755 - 57, ins., 26, -0.0840 - 48, ins., 26, -0.0704
12 13, 10 / 3, 3, 0 6 / 0
Globalization:
- Total index, KOF (higher globalization => higher indicator value) + 64, 2 s., 30, 0.1253 + 61, 2 s., 30, 0.1092 + 48, 5 s., 30, 0.0617
25 7, 7 / 36, 36, 3 11 / 3
- Economic globalization, KOF (higher globalization => higher indicator value) - 42, 2 s., 30, -0.0602 - 44, 1 s., 30, -0.0704 - 45, 5 s., 30, -0.0891
25 8, 7 / 4, 4, 3 8 / 3
Inequality of income:
- Gini, WDI (more unequal income distribution => higher index value) - 49, ins., 30, -0.0344 - 50, 1 s., 30, -0.0517 fragile, 30, -0.0084
26 22, 21 / 20, 20, 7 11 / 7
- Richest 10% to poorest 10%, UN, WDI  - 44, 1 s., 29, -0.0145 fragile, 29, -0.0148 + 55, 21 s., 29, 0.0680
30 13, 12 / 51, 51, 30 3 / 30
- Richest 20% to poorest 20%, WDI - 45, ins., 29, -0.0137 fragile, 29, -0.0179 + 53, 11 s., 29, 0.0573
30 14, 13 / 50, 50, 30 3 / 30  31
Gender: 
- Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%), WDI  + 55, ins., 30, 0.0609 + 44, 1 s., 30, 0.0632 fragile, 30, 0.0530
25 13, 12 / 19, 19, 6 10 / 6
- Gender empowerment measure, UN + 51, ins., 30, 0.0478 fragile, 30, 0.0567 - 42, ins., 30, 0.0284
26 13, 11 / 23, 23, 3 8 / 3
Aging: 
- Dependents to working-age persons, WDI + 65, 36 s., 30, 0.2618 + 66, 31 s., 30, 0.2661 + 68, 47 s., 30, 0.2861
29 9, 9 / 3, 3, 2 6 / 2
- Population ages 65 and above (% of total), WDI - 65, 1 s., 30, -0.0657 - 59, 1 s., 30, -0.0558 fragile, 30, -0.0240
25 9, 8 / 10, 10, 5 4 / 5
Population structure:
- Urban population (% of total), WDI - 44, ins., 30, -0.0440 - 42, ins., 30, -0.0320 - 43, 1 s., 30, -0.0214
25 9, 8 / 10, 10, 4 6 / 4
Credit indicators: 
- Access to credit, WEF fragile, 30, -0.0215 - 42, ins., 30, -0.0243 - 53, 19 s., 30, -0.0992
29 6, 5 / 6, 6, 1 7 / 1
- Domestic credit (% of GDP), WDI - 69, 21 s., 30, -0.1619 - 66, 23 s., 30, -0.1498 - 60, 9 s., 30, -0.0980
25 10, 8 / 5, 5, 4 10 / 4
- Credit market regulations, Fraser (less govt. influence on allocation of credit =>higher value) - 67, 14 s., 30, -0.2257 - 65, 13 s., 30, -0.2262 - 68, 43 s., 30, -0.2962
22 12, 9 / 3, 3, 0 8 / 0
- Venture capital availability, WEF - 52, 6 s., 30, -0.1737 - 53, 3 s., 30, -0.1827 - 68, 34 s., 30, -0.2502
22 12, 10 / 4, 4, 2 6 / 2
- Standard deviation of inflation; Fraser (less variance => higher indicator value) fragile, 30, -0.0252 fragile, 30, -0.0259 fragile, 30, -0.0107
28 10, 10 / 6, 6, 4 7 / 4  
 
 
Note: The sensitivity of the influence of each variable on the shadow economy proxy, i.e. the ratio of currency holdings to M2 (cm2ifs), was tested in regressions 
using, one by one, the labor market and tax indicators (see Appendix 1). The equation was specified as follows: cm2ifs = gdprpppc + itstr + i + k, where i 
represents either one of the labor market indicators or an indicator of the tax and social security burden, and k represents the respective indicator of the list of
economic institutions and other influences and subjective factors shown in this table.  The sample includes up to a maximum of 38 OECD and Eastern European
countries covering the period 1991-2007. Mean values are used.  The inclusion of additional controls such as an indicator of inflation and of government size,
which are consistently statistically insignificant, does not significantly influence these results. Relatively highly significant results are shaded.
Meaning of the statements in the cells, in the order of their appearance:
First row: 
Sign of estimated coefficient of the respective labor market indicator; number of regressions with this sign out of a total of 200 estimated regressions; number of regressions where
the estimated sign is statistically significant (at least at the 10% level of significance); number of N countries (in the majority of all regressions); and beta coefficient (the estimated 
effect in standard deviation units to be able to directly compare the relative quantitative influence of the estimated coefficients; see also the ranking of the indicators of this table).
Second row: 
OLS regressions: Number of significant Ramsey regression specification-error tests (RESET) for omitted variables.
2SLS regressions: 
First value: Number of significant endogeniety tests with regard to the respective tax variable and the respective variable representing other influences using Wooldridge's robust
score chi-squared test. Second value: Same as before but using the robust regression F-test.  Three values behind slash give the number of significant tests of the validity of the 
instruments using, respectively, a) Sargan's chi-squared test, b) Basman's chi square test, and c) Wooldridge's robust score test.
GMM regressions: 
First value: Number of significant endogeniety tests using Sargan's C-statistic. Second value behind slash: Number of significant tests of the validity of the instruments using 
Hansen's J-statistic shi-squared test. 
Specifics of the regressions:
OLS: Regressions estimated with robust standard errors.
 2SLS and GMM: The indicator k was instrumented due to its potential endogeniety using the following instruments: legal origin of country, (i.e. either british, french, german,
scandinavian, or socialist), language, latitude, religious and ethnic fractionalization. The equations were estimated using robust standard errors and small sample adjustments.  32
Table 7
Ranking of indicators of other institutional characteristics and subjective factors in influencing the SE 1/
Average 
Subgroup of indicator, beta 
see appendix 1 Indicator coefficient Rank 
Corruption - Extent of Political corruption, WVS (higher perceived corruption  => higher value)  0.613 1
Feelings and Expectations - Feeling of happiness, WVS (higher affirmation => higher indicator value) -0.500 2
- Satisfaction with your life, WVS (higher affirmation => higher indicator value) -0.450 3
- Freedom from Corruption, Heritage (less corruption => higher indicator value) -0.432 4
Quality of justice system - Judicial independence, WEF (higher independence => higher indicator value) -0.381 5
Economic Institutions - Protection of property rights, Heritage -0.377 6
- Corruption , TI (less corruption => higher value)  -0.372 7
Quality of State representatives - Favoritism in decisions of government officials, WEF (less favoritism => higher value)  -0.358 8
Quality of administration - Control of Corruption, WBGI -0.354 9
Socioeconomic conditions - Socioeconomic conditions -0.353 10
- Impact of business costs of corruption, WEF (lower impact => higher value)  -0.353 11
- Integrity of the legal system, Fraser (higher integrity => higher indicator value) -0.350 12
Quality of enterprise - Ethical behavior of firms, WEF (better => higher indicator value)  -0.350 13
representatives
- Diversion of public funds to companies etc., WEF (less diversion => higher value)  -0.347 14
Administrative burden - Business Freedom, Heritage (more "freedom" => higher indicator value) -0.345 15
- Government Effectiveness, WBGI -0.333 16
- Irreg. paym. in judicial decisions, WEF (less irreg. => higher indicator value) -0.330 17
- Irreg. paym. in public contracts, WEF (less irreg. => higher indicator value) -0.319 18
- Effectiveness of law-making bodies, WEF (higher effectivenss => higher value)  -0.312 19
- Quality of information regarding changes in policies & regulations, WEF  -0.309 20
- Investor protection index, IFC (better protection => higher indicator value) -0.307 21
Constitutional system - Rule of Law, WBGI  -0.301 22
- Efficiency of legal framework, WEF (more efficient => higher indicator value) -0.290 23
Elements of direct democracy - Democratic accountability, ICRG -0.290 24
- Efficiency of legal framework, WEF (more efficient => higher indicator value) -0.290 25
- Impartial courts, Fraser (higher impartiality => higher indicator value) -0.285 26
Values/Moral - Govt. should allow more freedom for individuals, WVS (higher affirmation=>higher value)  0.278 27
Quantity and quality of  - Irregular payments in exports & imports, WEF (less irregularity => higher indicator value)  -0.277 28
public goods provision
Aging - Aging: Dependents to working-age persons, WDI 0.271 29
- Investor protection index, IFC (better protection => higher indicator value)
      - Director Liability index -0.276 30
Crime - Organized crime, WEF (less cost of crime => higher indicator value) -0.269 31
- Spend time with friends, WVS (higher affirmation => higher value)  -0.265 32
- Extra payments/bribes, Fraser (less bribes => higher indicator value) -0.262 33
Punishment  - Punishment: Number prisoners (per 100 th. population) 0.257 34
- Reliability of police services, WEF (higher reliability => higher indicator value)  -0.255 35
- Prevalence of illegal political donations, WEF (less prevalance => higher value)  -0.253 36
- Impact of nepotism, WEF (less influence => higher indicator value)  -0.250 37
- Regulation of entry (=contract law, legal formalism), IFC (higher cost => higher value) 0.238 38
- Policy consequences of legal political donations, WEF (less influence => higher value) -0.234 39
- Irregular payments in public utilities, WEF (less irregularity => higher indicator value)  -0.233 40
- Regime Durability, Polity -0.231 41
- Political action signing a petition (have done) -0.215 42
Trade related adminis- - Trade freedom, Heritage -0.214 43
trative burden
- Reliability of bribes, WEF (higher confidence in reliabilty > higher value)  0.213 44
- Investor protection index, IFC (better protection => higher indicator value)
      - Disclosure index -0.213 45
Decentralization  - Decentralization of economic policymaking, WEF (more decentralized => higher value) 0.207 46
- Willingness to delegate authority, WEF (higher willingness => higher indicator value)  -0.205 47
- Competence of public officials relative to private sector, WEF (higher comp.=>higher value)  -0.186 48
Tax enforcement - Verification activities per taxpayer, OECD 0.186 49
Complexity of tax system - Complexity of tax system:  tax payments (number), WDI 0.179 50
- Burden of government regulation, WEF (less burdensome => higher indicator value) -0.174 51
- Regulatory quality, WBGI (higher quality => higher indicator value) -0.170 52
- Family important in life, WVS (higher affirmation => higher value)  -0.168 53
- Number of legal procedures to collect an unpaid check (contract law, legal formalism), IFC 0.162 54
- Time req. to start a business, WEF (higher bureaucracy => higher indicator value) 0.160 55
Educational system - School enrollment, secondary  (% gross) -0.149 56
- Administrative requirements, Fraser (less bureaucratic cost => higher indicator value) -0.148 57
- Quality of public schools, WEF -0.140 58
Credit indicators - Domestic credit (% of GDP) -0.137 59
- Confidence in social security system, WVS (higher confidence => higher indicator value)  -0.130 60
- Confidence in justice system, WVS -0.130 61
- Tax auditors per taxpayer, in o/oo, OECD -0.124 62
- Efficacy of supervisory boards, WEF (higher efficacy => higher indicator value)  -0.123 63
- Having Democratic system in Country is good, WVS (higher affirmation => higher value) 0.122 64
State of cluster development  - State of cluster development (limited vs. common and deep), WEF (deep=> high value) -0.117 65
Values/Moral - Income equality (should be made more equal), WVS (higher affirmation => higher value)  -0.114 66
- Tax administration staff per taxpayer, OECD -0.081 67
1/ Ranking based on the quantitative importance of the indicators as measured by the average beta coefficient (absolute value) of the respective OLS, 2SLS,and GMM 
estimations. Only indicators with consistently estimated signs were included. The beta coefficient (<1) represents the estimated average change in standard deviation
units.Indicators are marked bold when they are the first representative of the indicator subgroup to which they belong in the list of all indicators, appendix 1.
2/Vulnerable employment is unpaid family workers and own-account workers as a percentage of employment. No data available for important countries, e.g. Canada,
all scandinavian countries, UK, USA.
Source: Own estimates.    33
 
enforcement, punishment, availability of credit, educational system, constitutional system, and others. 
The degree of robustness of the major groups of indicators can be judged visually in table 6 by 
looking at the extent of highlighted results. For instance, the importance of corruption can thus 
immediately be seen since all indicators in this subgroup are in all estimations significant according to 
the adopted definition and therefore marked. 
 
All five indices of the top ranking group of corruption suggest that it fuels shadow economic activity. 
Given the theoretical debate whether corruption it is a complement or a substitute to the shadow 
economy (see table 1, section 2, the 6
th major indicator group “values and moral”), our finding 
supports the view that corruption and the SE are complementary and thus a substitute for the official 
economy not only in low income countries as suggested by Dreher and Schneider (2006), but also in 
high income countries. Given the many forms of corruption occurring especially in relatively rich 
industrial countries as documented, for instance, in the reports by transparency international, 
governments should use this result as further evidence of the importance to improve institutions so as 
to reduce incentives for corruption in the first place rather than simply raising punishment and fines, 
which may be ineffective.
14  
 
Second ranking is our indicator of happiness. This high rank corresponds to the increasing attention 
received by the economics of happiness and attempts to augment GDP by “happiness” (e.g. 
Kahneman and Krueger (2006).
15 Specifically, the indicators ‘happiness’ and ‘satisfaction with life’ are 
second and third ranking in table 7 and second and fourth in our overall ranking. In our country 
sample happiness is highly positively correlated with per capita income, but happiness is not highest 
in the richest countries. It is highest in the relatively small island countries Iceland, New Zealand and 
Ireland (in the two decades before the crisis of 2009). Indeed, Iceland and New Zealand have very 
small estimated shadow economies.
16  
 
Third ranking is the quality of justice system (subgroup of group 4 in the list of indicators, appendix 
1). This further corroborates the above hypothesis of seeing the standard assumed causes of the SE 
as conditional, because the impact of, for instance, a relatively high tax burden on the shadow 
economy may be mitigated by high quality of justice system, administration and other factors. For 
instance, the indices of this subgroup judicial independence, integrity of the legal system, irregular 
payments in judicial decisions and impartial courts are highly ranked taking the fifth to 26th place in 
                                                 
14 As one of many examples we mention the effective degree of independence of supervisory boards from 
executive boards. If, for instance, supervisory board members are traditionally former executive board members 
and even come from the same company, there will always be the impression of bias promoting manager 
capitalism. Another example is to realize that daily widespread corruption in wealthy countries is often directly 
connected to governments: for instance, enterprises which are through personal links or otherwise close to a 
national, regional or local government receive contracts without or with biased open tendering.  
15 Bhutan is the first and only country whose government focuses, already since the 1980s, on “gross national 
happiness” instead of GDP. It is based on the Buddhist principle and includes the environment, community 
participation and the need for balance between work and other activities. In 2009, as a reaction to the financial 
crisis, France suggested for the G20 to augment GDP by “happiness” and commissioned a study by Joseph 
Stiglitz on how to ensure that governments take account of the well-being and happiness of their citizens. 
However, comparing the international ranking of happiness using the "happy planet index" from the New 
Economics Foundation (see Abdallah et al., 2009) with the estimated sizes of the SE in 145 countries by 
Schneider (2007), we do not find that countries with relatively high happiness have relatively low shadow 
economies even in clusters of similar countries. In the “happy planet index” developing countries, especially 
from the Carribean, Middle- and South America and Bhutan rank among the top. Of the industrial countries 
highest ranking are the Netherlands (43), and Malta (44). Hence, achieving a high degree of “happiness” is not 
a sufficient condition for a relatively small SE.  
16 However, it is difficult to argue that high happiness and a low shadow economy may result from the island 
situation that could promote very homogenous societies, because New Zealand has, for instance, a relatively 
high degree of ethnical diversity. This underlines that a given degree of the SE cannot be explained by one or 
few major determinants but there are several or many relevant influences which are conditional. As noted 
before, empirical analyses with extensive specifications are, however, impossible with the available data.    34
table 7, where in all cases the estimated minus sign means that higher quality reduces the SE. 
Interestingly and as shown in the overview of theories, table 1 above, the topic of the quality of the 
justice system in wealthy countries has been taken up relatively recently by theorists (Glaser et al., 
2000) and empiricists (Aaken et al., 2008), who draw analogous conclusions. The relatively high 
significance of the indicators of the quality of the justice system suggests it is necessary to take the 
perceptions of people seriously when studying influences on shadow economic activity. There cannot 




Fourth ranking is property rights protection. The robust property rights protection indices in table 7 
rank on places 6, 30, and 45. Consistent with the theory of property rights, their protection reduces 
the SE. There is a debate in the institutional economics literature on which specific institutions are 
best explaining long run economic growth performance. Property rights were found to be relatively 
more important than contracting institutions or contract law, which supports private contracts 
(Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). It is interesting to note that our results are consistent with this finding 
since property rights indices tend to have higher ranks of significance and quantitative impact in 
reducing the shadow economy than the indicators of contract law (‘regulation of entry’, rank 38, and 
‘number of legal procedures to collect an unpaid check’, rank 54). 
 
The fifth, sixth, and eighth rank in table 7 have indicators, which are very similar to each other: 
‘quality of state representatives’, ‘quality of administration’, and ‘quality of enterprise 
representatives’ (see the detailed indicators of these subgroups in the last main group 7 ‘other 
influences and subjective factors’ in appendix 1). This underlines the importance of perceptions of 
economic agents for the shadow economy regarding the actions of people in power, foremost those in 
public office.
18 Note that these indicators refer to perceptions of people and not to proven facts.  
 
The findings show that the perception of government effectiveness, judicial impartiality, quality of both 
state and enterprise representatives are relatively high ranking influences on the SE in wealthy OECD 
countries and not only in developing countries. Hence, using the ample room for improvements in 
these areas could contribute in the medium term to reducing the SE which may be particularly true 
after events like the financial crisis and recession of 2008-09 since it is clear to taxpayers that they 
bear the costs.
19  
                                                 
17 Examples may be state prosecutors who, despite formal independence, are de facto dependent on 
supervisors who follow orders by others and politicians; and the cases of CEO’s being acquitted (often through 
‘voluntary’ payments) despite fraudulent breach of trust to the disadvantage of shareholders (manager 
capitalism), whereas the courts confirm the firing of long-serving employees without notice even for trivial 
offenses (e.g. suspected embezzlement of a deposit receipt for an empty bottle).  
18 Examples of robust indicators are ‘favoritism in decisions of government officials’ (rank 8), control of 
corruption (rank 9), ‘ethical behavior of firms’ (13), ‘diversion of public funds to companies etc.’ (14), 
‘government effectiveness (16), ‘irregular payments in public contracts‘ (18), ‘quality of information regarding 
changes in policies and regulations’ (20), ‘efficiency of legal framework’ (25), ‘prevalence of illegal political 
donations’ (36), ‘policy consequences of legal political donations’ (39), ‘irregular payments in public utilities’ (40), 
‘willingness to delegate authority’ (47) ‘competence of public officials relative to private sector’ (48),  and 
‘efficacy of supervisory boards’ (63). The surprisingly large number of scandals involving managements of well 
known enterprises during the past decade and the financial crisis of 2008/09 may be an incentive to analyze 
better the effective degree of openness and competition of markets for enterprise managers and supervisory 
board members.  
19  The case of the financial crisis 2008-09 may be an example showing room in improving perceived 
government effectiveness: international organizations (especially the IMF and the BIS with its Institute for 
Financial Stability, IFS) and national financial supervisory institutions (central banks together with other 
supervisory institutions) had a mandate – which was made more explicit after the Asian financial crisis of 1997 - 
to effectively monitor the stability of the financial system. But even despite warnings from scientists in 2006 and 
2007, which were delivered at IMF headquarter and at meetings of central bank governors at the BIS (e.g. New 
York Times, 2006 on Roubini’s warnings; and White, 2006), these institutions failed to propose and to take any 
action before the crisis. Ironically and possibly setting wrong incentives, the crisis gave the IMF more power and 
saved it from having to reduce its staff, which otherwise would have been necessary due to decreased demand 
for its loans. Although some of these institutions usually emphasize the importance of personal responsibility,   35
 
Socioeconomic conditions have the seventh rank with an estimated quantitative impact of about the 
same size as the second ranking tax and labor market indicators. Their improvement reduces the SE. 
 
The administrative burden belongs with taxes to the standard causes of the SE in most of the 
relevant empirical literature. In our ranking (see table 7) the highest place of an indicator of this 
subgroup is ‘business freedom’ on the 15th place. Other indicators of this subgroup rank considerably 
lower, i.e. extra payments/bribes (33), the burden of government regulation (51), and administrative 
requirements (57). All of them show that a higher burden promotes the SE.  
 
One particular goal of this study was to analyze the influence of the constitution, in particular 
elements of direct democracy, which, to the best of our knowledge were not yet analyzed in a cross 
section panel, since only one OECD country, Switzerland, has this political system of a direct 
democracy, and therefore studies concentrate on this country. Since other countries have elements of 
direct democracy, we use indicators of these elements.  
The eight tested constitutional system indicators show that the polity scores given to countries by the 
polity project of the University of Maryland and the indicators of the World Bank for political stability 
and rule of law have a dampening effect on the shadow economy, where half of them are robust.  
All of the four available indicators concerning direct democracy, show that it reduces the SE; two of 
them are robust, namely ‘democratic accountability’ and ‘political action signing a petition’, which are 
ranked 24th und 43rd, respectively.  
 
The subgroup values and moral is next ranking. The first two of its indicators, ‘government should 
allow more freedom for individuals’ (rank 27), and ‘impact of nepotism‘ (37), have robust positive 
signs, indicating that dissatisfaction of people with their freedom and nepotism tend to promote the 
SE. By contrast, the indicators ‘spend time with friends’ (32), and ‘family important in life’ (53) have 
robust and expected negative signs, showing that sociality reduces the SE. The indicator ‘income 
equality should be made more equal’ (66) is presumably highly correlated with the degree of 
inequality. It has a negative sign although theory predicts higher income inequality to push up the SE 
(see table 1, section 2). Other indicators of income inequality are insignificant. An admittedly tentative 
explanation of this unexpected minus sign could be that as the income distribution is felt to be 
disturbingly uneven, people nevertheless may have benefited from more liberal markets through 
employment opportunities in the official economy, which would reduce the SE. 
 
Another major goal of this paper was to test whether indeed the quality and quantity of public 
services is a conditional factor to the burden of taxes. Although this could not be tested through use 
of interaction models, the respective subgroup of indicators is relatively highly ranked on the 12
th 
place in table 7. All of the first seven indicators in this subgroup have a negative sign, meaning that 
higher quality and quantity reduces the SE. Four of them are robust in our definition, namely quality of 
public schools, reliability of police services, irregular payments in exports and imports, and confidence 
in the social security system, taking ranks from the 8th to the 61st place. It is interesting to see that 
the other three indicators in this subgroup, whose sign is fragile, are less close to the meaning of 
quality of public services, namely confidence in government, confidence in parliament and confidence 
in political parties. Overall, this result is taken as supporting the hypothesis that indeed governments 
can regard the quality of public services as a conditional factor to the tax burden.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
after the crisis consequences of governments regarding personal responsibilities at these institutions and within 
themselves hardly became known. Governments have also not been able to internationally coordinate and 
implement substantive regulatory reforms despite elaborate proposals from scientists. On the EU level a 
necessary institution to effectively coordinate economic policies or at least provide EU countries with all 
information about planned economic policies of other EU countries is still missing. Moreover, some 
governments have not reformed exceptions concerning financial supervision (e.g. in Germany among the 
largest loss making institutions due to the financial crisis of 2008/09 were state-owned or state-related banks 
because they or their subsidiaries had most heavily invested in US sub-prime bonds). Nevertheless, KfW, for 
instance, is exempted from normal banking supervision, continues to be supervised by the Finance Ministry, 
and has a politically dependent supervisory board of 37 persons. These are merely few examples that may 
indicate room for governments to improve their perceived effectiveness.   36
 
Also a plausible result is that the aging variable, dependants to working age persons, has a very 
robust positive impact on the SE, ranked 13th: aging thus tends to fuel the SE. Following the results 
just reported, the government can, however, counteract this effect, for instance, through raising the 
confidence in the social security system and the quality of other public goods.  
 
Of the remaining indicator subgroups in table 7 we comment a few results, some of which are very 
interesting:   
 
Organized crime is promoting the SE, a plausible result which enables us to estimate below the 
crime related part of the shadow economy.  
 
Regarding punishment there is only one and for our purpose relatively weak indicator available, 
which shows a robust, positive effect on the SE. Of course, all results of these estimations need to be 
cautiously interpreted but this surprising result is nevertheless fully consistent with the new theory on 
punishment and tax morale (see table 2, section 5, last subgroup punishment). This literature argues 
theoretically and shows empirically that punishment needs to be seen critical, especially regarding 
minor offenses, if it is supposed to be successful in reducing offenses and not as a means to retaliate. 
Taken at face value the positive sign says that punishment does not help in reducing the SE but even 
contributes to it. This may corroborate the question as to potential alternatives to recent policies of 
OECD countries raising further punishment levels for shadow economic activity and tax evasion.  
 
Decentralization has a theoretically ambiguous effect on the SE (see category 7, subgroup 4, table 
2). On the one hand, it can reduce revenue maximizing behavior of governments thus dampening the 
SE. On the other hand, it may result in more corruption, higher influence of interest groups, and lower 
quality of government decisions, which would tend to promote the SE. Given an estimated positive 
robust sign of our proxy for decentralization (degree of decentralization assessed by executives 
selected by the World Economic Forum), we find support for the second theoretical view, i.e. the SE is 
positively affected by decentralization. It would be plausible if corruption is a main channel from 
decentralization to the SE, given its high positive correlation with the SE. 
 
For tax enforcement, ranked 19th, a negative sign was expected, if it has a deterrence effect and if it 
does not cause adverse reactions of people that may over-compensate deterrence. Indeed, two of the 
three indicators have a robust negative sign, i.e. ‘tax auditors per taxpayer’ (rank 62) and ‘tax 
administration staff per taxpayer’ (67). However, a surprising and interesting result is the estimated 
positive robust sign of the tax enforcement indicator ‘verification activities per taxpayer’ (49), 
suggesting that verification activities promote the SE. 
This result can be plausible and consistent with the theory and new experimental empirical evidence, 
if the two first mentioned enforcement indicators differ qualitatively from the last one in the sense that 
‘verification activities’ would measure those actions of tax authorities, which from the viewpoint of the 
taxpayer tend to be disproportionate or unwarranted. If this indicator reflects also actions, which 
taxpayers perceive as unjustified, adverse effects can be created (more tax evasion), which may 
overcompensate the deterrence effect. This is consistent with the literature on tax morale, social 
norms and social interactions (summarized in table 2, sections 6 and 7), which finds strong evidence 
for fairness effects, intrinsic motivations, reciprocity and cooperative behavior: Hence, the taxpayer 
reacts to actions perceived as unwarranted by increasing tax evasion and shadow economic activity. 
This assumes that risk aversion is not pronounced, an influence we cannot test, because of the lack 
of a satisfying indicator.  
 
The 20th ranked subgroup complexity of the tax system has a positive robust sign, supporting the 
theoretical view that complexity increases perceived unfairness, uncertainty, and can even undermine 
the constitution. Thus, the opposing theoretical possibility for tax complexity to reduce the SE through 
use of tax loopholes and promotion of legal tax avoidance appears to be overcompensated. 
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Finally, the educational system has the expected negative and robust sign, which is a pleasant 
result since endeavors to raise the level of education will dampen the SE although the quantitative 
impact is one of the lowest of the robust variables in table 7. 
4.4  Estimated size of the shadow economy and causes 
 
Before summarizing the estimates of the size of the SE it needs to be emphasized that these 
estimates are directly proportional to the value of the assumed income velocity. Hence, they are 
highly sensitive to it as can be seen in the following three scenarios. Since this assumption remains 
speculative, the estimates are only indicative. 
 
Thorough discussions of the velocity assumption and of the sensitivity of the results to it are hard to 
find in the literature as are analyses explaining the large differences in currency velocity of otherwise 
similar countries. Consider, for instance, the large differences in average currency velocity values 
during 1991-2007 of the UK (38), France (31), USA (19) and Germany (15). Since recently there is a 
rebirth of estimates of the SE using structural models, so-called Mimic models (multiple indicators and 
multiple causes, first applied on the SE by Frey and Weck-Hannemann, 1984). But this approach too 
cannot avoid the problem of making a velocity assumption, because a Mimic model always generates 
an index of the SE whose transformation to ratios of the SE to official GDP necessitates using other 
SE ratios as benchmarks, which are usually taken from studies using the currency method. Hence, 
estimates of the size of the SE on the basis of a Mimic model are directly tied to a currency model 
besides their own problems (Breusch, 2005a, 2005b, 2006).  
 
We discuss the problem of the necessary velocity assumption in appendix 3 and present a range of 
velocity assumptions used to produce three scenarios I-III. This demonstrates how sensitive the SE 
estimates are and thus neither currency demand nor Mimic models enable the economic science to 
provide a rather precise estimate of the size of the SE for each country. However, appendix 3 
demonstrates criticism of choosing a relatively high value of velocity because this overstates the work 
currency does in the generation of observed income (e.g Breusch, 2005, p.33). Moreover, there is a 
clear declining trend of velocity. And appendix 4 discusses which velocity assumption is consistent 
with the micro evidence on the size of the SE: it suggests choosing a relatively low velocity such as 
M2.  
 
It is thus interesting to see that both discussions, which are independent of each other, i.e. that of the 
velocity assumption in appendix 3, and that of the micro evidence in appendix 4, suggest scenario 1 
as the only one which is consistent with both. Hence, scenario I would have more appeal than the 
other two scenarios.   
 
First, however, table 8 shows the estimation results of equation 3 with few selected specifications and 
estimation methods. Model 2 was selected to produce the estimates. As explained before, given the 
limited number of observations, choosing an extended specification is difficult since inclusion of more 
independent variables tends to lower the statistical significance of individual variables and of the 
estimated equation. Nevertheless, all models yield similar results that largely confirm theoretical 
expectations: Crime is estimated to statistically significantly increase currency demand, enabling us to 
simulate two shadow economies, i.e. one that is related to organized crime, and one which is not 
crime related. In model 2, the administrative and the tax burden are statistically significantly positively 
associated with currency holdings. Also social security contributions paid by employers significantly 
promote currency demand. Tax enforcement is estimated to reduce the SE, but not statistically 
significant. But the quality of public services, proxied here by the quality of public schools, is 
statistically significantly reducing the SE. In fact, this influence has the highest significance in all 
models. Our proxy for elements of direct democracy negatively affects the SE, albeit not statistically 
significant. Dummies for Eastern Europe and year dummies for the introduction of the Euro in EMU 
countries are included to improve the forecasting power of the regression. Test results of the overall 
quality of the regressions are shown at the bottom of table 8 showing that their statistical properties 
appear satisfactory, i.e. all test statistics are not statistically significant.    38
Table 8
Pure Cross Section Regression Results of Currency to M2 Functions
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 2 model 2
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (2SLS) (GMM)
GDP real per capita at PPP 0.0000029 0.0000034 0.0000037 0.0000038 0.0000043
(2.64)** (3.00)** (3.15)** (2.37)** (2.75)**
0.5693 0.6578 0.7245
real short term interest rate 0.0037 0.0061 0.0056 0.0066 0.0100
(0.72) (1.39) (1.10) (1.53) (2.03)*
0.1468 0.2423 0.2312
Organized crime, WEF -0.0079 -0.0109 -0.0064 -0.0114 -0.0099
(higher value => lower cost of crime) (-2.01)* (-3.23)*** (-1.76) (-3.48)*** (-4.29)***
-0.1944 -0.2694 -0.1520
Administr. Burden: Business Freedom, Heritage 0.0002
(higher value => lower burden) -0.2200
0.0380
Administr. Burden: Time req. to start a business, 0.0006 0.0008 0.0007
WEF (higher value => higher burden) (2.06)* (3.51)*** (2.98)**
0.2512
Administr. Burden: No. of procedures to resolve  0.0010
a dispute, WEF (higher value => higher burden) -0.9700
0.1120
Tax burden: Total tax revenue, % of GDP 0.0009 0.0011 0.0006 0.0012 0.0007
(1.550) (1.79)* (1.130) (1.86)* (1.46)
0.1965 0.2475 0.1502
Social security contrib. employers, % of GDP 0.0029 0.0021 0.0028 0.0021 0.0024
(2.05)* (2.02)* (2.28)** (1.89)* (3.06)***
0.2959 0.2224 0.3062
Tax enforcement: Number of tax auditors per -4.2687 -2.8239 -4.2535 0.0000 -3.6721
taxpayer, OECD (-1.31) (-0.81) (-1.26) 0.0000 (-1.25)
-0.1596 -0.1056 -0.1711
Quality of public goods: Quality of public  -0.0305 -0.0253 -0.0281 -0.0234 -0.0228
schools, WEF (higher value => higher quality) (-3.18)*** (-2.91)** (-3.32)*** (-2.68)** (-2.19)**
-0.7301 -0.6044 -0.7150
Complexity of tax system: Tax payments;  0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
number, WDI (higher value => higher complexity) (0.86) (1.27) (1.09) (1.51) (1.47)
0.0974 0.1224 0.1485
Direct democracy: Political action signing a  -0.0374 -0.0317 -0.0392 -0.0333 -0.0440
petition (have done), WVS (-1.27) (-1.19) (-1.14) (-1.16) (-1.70)
-0.2020 -0.1716 -0.2309
Dummy Eastern Europe 0.0810 0.0753 0.0915 0.0765 0.0792
(3.01)** (3.61)*** (3.58)*** (3.23)*** (2.97)**
0.8029 0.7465 0.8236
Dummy Euro introduction in EMU countries  0.1353 0.1044 0.1140 0.0924 0.0923
(1.78) (1.86)* (1.52) (1.91)* (1.37)
0.3731 0.2879 0.3329
Constant 0.1360 0.1027 0.0997 0.0767 0.0729
(2.14)* (2.12)* (1.99)* (1.87)* (1.55)
N 25 25 23 25.0000 25.0000
R-squared 0.788 0.823 0.790 0.8050 0.7800
F-statistic 9.595 15.321 11.166 18.6700 45.1290
p-value_of_model 0.0002 0 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000
RMSE 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.0150 0.0160
F-statistic_RESET 0.838 0.922 1.914
p-value_RESET 0.506 0.469 0.216
Tests of endogeneity of regressors:
p-value of robust score chi square test (1)   0.5573
p-value of robust regression F test (1,11)  0.7400
p-value of GMM C statistic chi square test (1)  1.0000
Tests of overidentifying restrictions:
p-value of score chi square test (7)           0.1719
p-value of Hansen's J chi square test (7) 0.2205
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Equations estimated with robust standard errors. T-statistics in parantheses below estimated coefficients. In the
third line (in OLS regressions) beta coefficients are shown.
Inclusion of additional variables to control for inflation and government size does not significantly affect the results and
these variables are consistently statistically insignificant. 
In the 2SLS and GMM regressions real GDP per capita was instrumented. The tests for endogeniety and validity of 
instruments are, however, also consistently insignificant when we instrument the presumed causes of the shadow 
economy. This means that the endogenous regressors in the model should be treated as exogenous and that the
instruments are valid, which corroborates the OLS results in this table.
Source: own calculations.    39
For our simulations we chose model 2, which has the highest R squared. Only the statistically 
significant independent variables are considered in the simulation, i.e. the variables organized crime, 
administrative burden, tax burden, social security burden and the quality of public services. 
 
The results of the three scenarios (scenario 1, table 9 below, and scenarios 2-3, tables 10-11, 
appendix 4) demonstrate their sensitivity to the velocity assumption: the estimates in scenario III are 
about 3 times higher than those in scenario I, although we chose only from a medium range of 
velocities (M2 velocity used in scenario 1, and a weighted average of M1 and currency velocity in 
scenario 3 to reproduce Schneider’s estimates for Germany). We discuss the velocity assumption in 
appendix 3. 
 
Summarizing briefly the main features of these tables we find that in industrial countries the SE 
related to organized crime tends to be mostly about half of the estimated total SE with some 
exceptions, e.g. USA, where it would be over 70% of the total, and Korea, Greece, and Japan (about 
50-60% of the total, table 9). The estimated organized crime related SE is higher in Eastern European 
and developing countries compared to industrial countries (with the exception of Japan). However, for 
many of these countries we have no total SE estimate because of missing or inconsistent data 
regarding some or all of the considered individual causes for it.  
 
An interesting case is that of Denmark, where the non-crime related SE is estimated to be zero and 
the crime-related SE is also very small, much less than 1% of official GDP. Of course, this is also the 
result of the method and the time period available for calculating these figures, because for our period 
of 1991-2007 we can obtain positive estimates of the individual causes of the SE only, if, for instance, 
the tax or other burden was during this period at some point higher than the period average. If there is 
no variation, the resulting SE will be zero. Nevertheless, the zero finding for Denmark and the 
relatively low estimates of the SE in the other Scandinavian countries demonstrate at least the 
possibility and confirm one main hypothesis of this paper, that a relatively high tax burden is not 
necessarily resulting in a high SE but this is conditional on many other factors of which for technical 
reasons only very few can be considered in these simulations.  
 
Another lesson is that the SE, especially the non-crime related SE, which is of greatest interest from 
an economic policy point of view, tends to be considerably lower than suggested by other studies that 
use the currency method, including Mimic models. Scenario 3 yields very large estimates whose 
average, regarding the countries of this sample, is similar to that calculated by Schneider et al. 
(2010).
20 But the currency velocity assumed to obtain these large figures is more than 7 times larger 
than that of scenario 1 although only the first scenario is consistent with both the micro evidence and 
the evidence on income velocity of currency (appendix 4).  
 
Besides pointing to a smaller magnitude of the SE than is often argued in macro studies, Table 9 may 
also be used to look at the relative quantitative importance of the causes of the SE: For instance, for 
major industrial countries like the USA, UK, Italy, Germany and France the perception of public 
services quality by economic agents appears to have a much higher quantitative impact than the tax 
and social security burden. This also corroborates the hypothesis of this paper that the influence of 
taxes can in principle be compensated. It is also interesting to see that the administrative burden in 
countries like New Zealand, which implemented since more than two decades comprehensive 
reforms of its public sector to make it more responsive to citizens, and Switzerland with its referenda,  
is estimated to have a zero impact on the SE. However, a country comparison of this particular 
influence also demonstrates a clear weakness of these estimates, since there are relatively similar 
countries (e.g. France and Germany) with very different estimated contributions of the administrative 
burden to the SE: one problem causing these anomalies is the given relatively short time period of 
only 17 years. Hence, the figures of table 9 are merely indicative and not more than suggestions for 
more discussions of potential causes of the SE and their quantifications.  
 
  
                                                 
20 For Germany and regarding the year 2007, the results are identical.   40
Table 9: Scenario I of the size of the shadow economy (SE) and individual causes (using average M2 velocity) 1/
(in percent of official GDP)
"Crime" 
Administra- Tax  Social secu- Quality of  shadow Total  Share of
tive burden burden  rity burden public servi- Non "crime-" economy  Shadow "crime" SE
(wef605) (ttrgdp) (ssccgdp) ces (wef508) related SE (wef111) Economy in total SE
Australia 0.00 0.36 n.a. 0.45 1.0
Austria 0.05 0.30 0.11 0.48 0.9 0.6 1.6 0.40
Belgium 0.38 0.45 0.14 0.79 1.8 1.2 2.9 0.40
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.05 3.8
Canada 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 2.4 2.4
Cyprus n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.55 2.8
Czech Republic n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.8
Denmark 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.3 0.3 1.00
Estonia 0.61 n.a. n.a. 0.28 1.3
Finland 0.00 0.18 0.09 0.29 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.30
France 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.31 0.5 0.8 1.3 0.61
Germany 0.57 0.16 0.15 0.38 1.3 1.0 2.3 0.45
Greece 0.00 0.77 0.27 0.41 1.5 1.9 3.3 0.56
Hungary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.3
Iceland 0.00 0.45 0.07 0.40 0.9 0.3 1.2 0.25
Ireland 0.70 0.66 0.09 0.76 2.2 1.4 3.6 0.39
Italy 0.00 0.30 0.08 1.02 1.4 2.5 3.9 0.64
Japan 0.40 0.45 0.39 1.11 2.3 3.3 5.7 0.59
Korea, Republic of 0.29 0.56 0.26 0.75 1.9 2.1 3.9 0.53
Latvia 0.03 n.a. n.a. 0.36 1.9
Lithuania 0.00 n.a. n.a. 0.43 2.0
Luxembourg 0.00 0.49 0.07 0.40 1.0 0.8 1.8 0.46
Malta n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.74 1.5
Mexico 0.58 0.11 n.a. 0.21 2.6
Netherlands 0.04 0.52 0.36 0.61 1.5 2.1 3.6 0.57
New Zealand 0.00 0.32 n.a. 0.50 1.0
Norway 0.23 0.24 0.08 0.55 1.1 0.5 1.7 0.33
Poland 0.00 0.29 n.a. 0.65 2.6
Portugal 0.59 0.68 0.54 0.60 2.4 1.0 3.4 0.28
Romania 0.20 n.a. n.a. 0.53 2.3
Slovak Republic 0.56 0.46 0.51 0.92 2.5 2.8 5.3 0.54
Slovenia 0.02 n.a. n.a. 0.91 1.9
Spain 0.50 0.26 0.15 0.39 1.3 1.4 2.7 0.51
Sweden 0.03 0.22 0.27 0.37 0.9 0.6 1.5 0.39
Switzerland 0.00 0.17 0.18 0.31 0.7 0.9 1.6 0.59
Turkey 0.11 0.53 0.17 0.41 1.2 1.9 3.1 0.60
United Kingdom 0.36 0.45 0.07 0.58 1.5 1.6 3.0 0.52
United States 0.02 0.23 0.02 0.40 0.7 1.9 2.6 0.74
1/ Velocity assumption of currency used in the unofficial economy: average of M2 velocities of two country groups: industrial countries,
including EMU countries: 1.48; for developing countries, including Eastern Europe: 2.07. 
Note: 
Given very large differences in velocities even among otherwise relatively similar countries, which are not well understood and have not 
been clarified, we used the average velocity of two country groups: EMU countries and other industrial countries, on the one hand, and
Eastern European and developing countries, on the other hand. The velocity used for each country is the average velocity of the country 
group to which it belongs. Not using averages would result in implausibly severe divergence of the estimates of the SE among otherwise
similar countries. In addition, since velocities of monetary aggregates of most countries exhibit marked time trends, only values of 2007
were used. Finally, monetary aggregates were both adjusted for estimated currency holdings abroad, meaning that velocities are slightly
higher than without this adjusmtment.
Source: own calculations.    41
5  Policy implications  
 
The well publicized statements by some OECD governments about relatively high assumed revenue 
losses due to the shadow economy and the measures some countries took to reduce it, especially 
through higher intensity of controls and auditing, and higher punishment for tax and other violations, 
suggest that previous high estimates of the size of the shadow economy have had their impact.
21 Quite 
understandably such high perceived revenue losses were interpreted by governments as offering an 
“easy” way out of fiscal pressure by raising revenues simply through increasing controls of and 
punishment for shadow economic activity without having to increase taxation or pursue difficult 
structural reforms including a simplifying comprehensive tax reform. But considering the micro 
evidence (appendix 4) and scenario 1 above it cannot surprise that the hoped for additional revenues 
did not materialize. Instead new substantial costs were incurred for the additional controls, auditing, 
and court proceedings (appendix 4). And these costs usually do not include costs for damages to 
businesses and people caused by unwarranted prosecutions, which may create new adverse 
incentives to economic agents. Also not considered are the potential costs due to reduced intrinsic 
motivation to pay taxes. Hence, contrary to the hoped for effect of higher revenues in the first place, 
the question is now whether the higher controls and punishment levels have adverse effects?
22  
 
However, even if the SE is relatively small in most OECD countries, policy-makers may nevertheless 
want to reduce it. The foregoing results and their evaluation suggest that alternatives to expensive 
controls and punishment are a comprehensive set of reforms of incentives if reforms influence the 




- Introduce elements of direct democracy (e.g. referenda) where participation of taxpayers appears 
warranted and feasible. 
- Strengthen democratic accountability, political stability, the rule of law. 
 
Tax and transfer system: 
 
- Simplify the tax system through introducing a neutral corporate and personal income tax, i.e. an 
allowance for corporate equity and regarding personal income taxation, a simple consumption tax in 
the form of an income tax with an allowance for capital income.
23 The reform can be cost neutral 
through a broadening of the tax base. 
                                                 
21 In 2006 Germany’s Finance Ministry published the figure of 70 billion Euros (more than 3% of GDP!) of 
revenue losses due to the SE, which equals 20% of the estimated value of the SE of Schneider (2010) of more 
than 350 billion Euros. The measures taken by OECD governments against the SE are described, for instance, 
in Williams et al., 2008, and for Austria and Germany in Feld and Schneider, 2010. 
22 Feld and Larsen (2006) found that there is no statistically significant effect of higher controls and punishment 
on the SE but given the cited experimental literature on social interactions, fairness and reciprocity effects, it is 
possible that higher controls and punishment levels, especially if they exceed a certain threshold level, have 
adverse effects, for instance, on the willingness of economic agents to voluntarily accept a given relatively high 
tax level. 
23 Note the discussion above of the statistically significant sign of the dummy for interest income taxation (end of 
chapter 4.1) and that by definition this system reduces or eliminates incentives to export capital to hide it. An 
income tax is an effective consumption tax and eliminates the intertemporal distortions if either saving or capital 
income is not taxed. Administration of the tax is easiest and most cost-effective if income, including saving, is 
taxed first, but the income derived from saving (capital income) is then not taxed. The switch to this system can 
be done more or less revenue neutral. This system will channel substantial resources currently used to deal with 
taxation into productive uses. It will substantially reduce the administrative cost. For instance, a simplification of 
the tax system in Germany could generate administrative savings of above 80000 civil servants in the IRS, 
which would mean (at an assumed average per capita cost of 60000 Euros) a saving of about 5 billion Euros 
each year, equivalent to above 0.2% of GDP annually plus the reduced staff of tax advisors. The medium term   42
- Reduce subsidies where possible. Provide transparent justification for each subsidy granted, best 
legitimized through referenda.  
- Keep transfers under control. Monitor growth of transfers relative to GDP and if necessary limit it.  
- Monitor and if necessary limit the size of government.
24  
- Keep taxes on foreign trade, customs duties and import tariffs moderate.  
- Monitor the total tax wedge, including social security contributions, and keep it at a moderate level, 
rather than trying to lower specific taxes such as in Austria, France, and Germany, which lowered the 
VAT rates for restaurants/hotels or tourism. 
- Social security contributions, both, those by employers and those by employees, are also relevant 
factors and should be stabilized.
25  
 
Labor market organization: 
 
The statements regarding the labor market organization need to be qualified because among the 
groups of influences commented here the labor market indicators have a relatively low estimated 
quantitative impact. 
 
- Unemployment and discouragement of workers are the most important labor market indicators that 
promote the SE. But programs meant to train, educate and employ unemployed do not statistically 
significantly help in reducing the SE. Hence, the conclusion would be to improve these programs 
and/or their organization in order for them to yield the expected results.  
 
- Increasing labor market flexibility tends to reduce the SE, specifically the subcomponents hiring and 
firing regulations, mandated cost of hiring, minimum wage, and length of military conscription. 
However, other components of the summary index “labor market flexibility” work in the opposite 
direction and liberalizing one or several components may have feedback effects on other influences. 
Hence, measures to increase labor market flexibility need to be carefully considered with due regard to 
the existing degree of labor market flexibility and other country characteristics.  
 
- Improve incentives particularly during initial phase of unemployment not to misuse unemployment 
benefits while simultaneously working in the SE. 
 
-  In countries with intense labor conflicts reduce them, e.g. through introduction or improvement of an 
institutionalized mediation process and/or more voluntary or institutionalized regular discussions 
between labor and management. 
 
- Improve the education, work opportunities and pay for woman because in our analysis the robust 
positive impact of labor participation on the SE appears to come from female labor participation. 
 
Other institutional and subjective influences: 
 
- Improve evaluation methods of the quality of government with the prime goal to reduce political and 
other corruption at all government levels. 
 
- Augment the concept of GDP by indicators of life satisfaction. (Note that life satisfaction and 
happiness tend to reduce the SE, but a high degree of “happiness” is not a sufficient condition for a 
relatively low SE).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
expansionary economic effects of a tax simplification would be a multiple of these savings due to economic 
activity undertaken, which is not pursued under current taxation, and higher incentives to work, invest and save. 
Hence tax revenues would rise. 
24 Adjust, for instance, the number of civil servants to demographic developments under due regard given to 
potential increases in demand for public services in line with increasing living standards. 
25 Hence, this would support the idea to finance social pensions for which no former payments were made 
though additional taxes, e.g. on fuel, and cut accordingly social security contributions.   43
- Improve the quality of the justice system (e.g. raise impartiality and effectiveness of courts as judged 
by economic agents through improved evaluation methods such as regular surveys of people and 
comparative evaluations; make state prosecutors independent from political influence).  
 
- Improve the quality of State representatives (e.g. higher incentives to reduce nepotism and favoritism 
in government decisions, and incentives for increased government effectiveness and quality of 
information regarding changes in policies and regulations, prevention of diversion of public funds to 
companies. Possibly all this could be promoted through more elements of direct democracy).   
 
- Improve the quality of enterprise representatives (members of directors and of supervisory boards; 
e.g. improve effective independence of supervisory boards from board members; improve incentives 
for managers to adopt long-term horizons; improve independence of those auditing the enterprise; 
analyze potential problems of “manager capitalism” and based on this possibly strengthen investor and 
shareholder rights).  
 
- Improve the quality of public goods and services (regular national and international published 
comparisons, intelligent evaluations by users
26 etc.). 
 
- Reform tax enforcement: a drastically simplified tax system implies reduced incentives for SE activity 
and tax evasion. Since this system saves extensive administrative costs, resources are available to 
potentially increase auditing and verification activities of taxpayers.  
 
- Improve punishment rules so that proportions are kept between different kinds of offenses and no 
adverse effects are created. Consider that shadow economic activity and tax evasion have several 
different motives. And consider whether other means can be more effective in achieving desired 
results such as the proposed tax system reform.  
 
- Coordinate the policy with EU partner countries and internationally, so as to reinforce the reform 
impact and to avoid contradictions. Since, for instance, new international distortions would be created if 
the proposed tax system reform would be implemented by one country alone, a coordinated tax 
system reform would be a best solution. 
 
Moral suasion policy to increase the impact on perceptions: 
 
- Complement the reforms by a moral suasion policy through modern information channels in the form 
of an education to pay taxes voluntarily by increasing transparency about essential government 
services and their quality. Based on the evidence for fairness effects, reciprocity, cooperative behavior 
etc., this could also be a relevant element in an overall strategy. 
 
6      Concluding remarks  
 
Cross-section analysis can be particularly useful when the emphasis is on long-term effects since 
differences in countries today reflect long term developments and the results are not influenced by the 
time dimension. This may justify use of our data set of period averages covering less than two 
decades with gaps. Admittedly, this limits the choice of specifications and the possibilities to test 
conditional hypotheses. However, the results obtained include a first time estimate of the organized 
crime related shadow economy and estimated consistently plausible effects of a large array of 
influences on the SE. Noteworthy, many of them appear to be quantitatively at least as relevant as the 
standard causes of unofficial activity (the tax and regulatory burden).  
 
                                                 
26 Introduce intelligent evaluation, for instance, by systematically collecting and using valuable information such 
as that of the reasons for parents to take their child from a school and choose another one.    44
This indirectly confirms the hypothesis for the effect of the standard causes on the SE to be 
conditional: a relatively high tax level may be associated with a relatively small SE depending on other 
influences. Most of these other relevant influences could well be affected by governments so there 
appears ample room for governments to influence the SE by other means than through taxation, the 
administrative burden, labor market regulation, and/or controls and punishment. Many of the 
influences found to be highly robust confirm new theoretical and experimental evidence on pro-social 
behavior.  
 
We also find that the relatively large estimated sizes of the SE on the basis of macro models 
(currency models or Mimic) stem from using a relatively high assumed income velocity of the currency 
used in the SE.
27 But a relatively low velocity can be much better defended, since the role of currency 
in income generation is small and continues to diminish. And assuming a relatively low income 
velocity, such as that of M2, yields estimates of the SE which are well in line with the micro evidence. 
Only then are macro models and the micro evidence consistent approaches suggesting the SE to be 
no larger than a few percent of official GDP. However, estimates of the SE are sensitive to the 
unavoidable velocity assumption and thus such estimates on the basis of currency demand or Mimic 
models can only be indicative. 
 
The often published relatively high estimates of the SE on the basis of macro models have had their 
effect on governments such that they believed and expected to raise enormous additional revenues 
through increasing both controls and punishment levels so as to reduce the SE. These measures 
included higher punishment levels, expensive additional controls of economic activity, of financial 
flows and even of ownership of currency, and special tax incentives to increase tax compliance 
making the tax system even more complex. In addition, the measures were implemented without 
international coordination. If the assumption is correct that the size of the SE in an average industrial 
country is a few percent of GDP these measures could not have raised the expected enormous 
revenues. And indeed, they yielded miniscule revenues but caused sizable new expenditures and 
potential other intangible costs, which have not yet been analyzed. But the divergence between 
expectations and facts does not appear to have led to conclusions. 
  
Irrespective of the true size of the SE, the results may suggest a catalogue of potential reform 
measures for influencing and reducing it as an alternative to the policies some OECD countries have 
chosen such as higher punishment levels, expensive additional controls of economic activity and 
unfortunately even more complex tax systems. Ideally, measures should be coordinated 
internationally and in the EU. They could be effective not only in promoting growth of official economic 




                                                 
27 As stated above, Mimic models yield an index whose transformation into actual estimated ratios of the SE to 
GDP requires using other such estimated ratios, which are usually taken from currency models without making 
explicit the assumed velocity. Hence, their results - as those of currency models - depend crucially on the 
velocity assumption.   45
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rate (and income threshold at 
which it applies) 
- Top marginal income and 
payroll tax rate (and income 
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Trade related: 
- Hidden trade barriers 
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Quality of administration:  
- Government Effectiveness 
 
- Control of Corruption 
 
- Efficiency of legal  
  framework 
- Irreg. paym. in public util. 
 
- Irreg. paym. in tax collect. 
 
- Irreg. paym. in publ.  
  contracts 
 
World Bank, Gov. Indic. 
 








































Quality of justice system: 
- Irregular payments in  
  judicial decisions 
- Judicial independence 
 
- Judicial independence 
 
- Integrity of the legal system 
 
- Impartial courts 
 
- Bribes for influencing laws, 
policies, regulations, decrees 
- Confidence in justice  














































Property rights and legal 
formalism: 




- Regulation of entry 
  (=contract law, legal 
  formalism)  
- Number of legal procedures 
  to collect an unpaid check  
  (contract law, legal  
  formalism) 
- Enforcing contracts (days) 
- Enforcing contracts (cost) 
 
- Legal enforcement 
   contracts 







IFC and Djankovic et al. 
(2002) 
 












95, 00-06, 38 
since 99, 
gaps, 38 
since 95, 38 
since 04, 35  
 
 




04-07, 33  
04-07, 35  
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- Auditing & Reporting Stand. 
 
- Investor protection index 
      - Disclosure index 
      - Director Liability index 
- Intensity of local 
competition 
 
- Investment Freedom 
- Monetary Freedom 

















06-07, 36  
since 00, 
gaps, 38 
since 95, 38 
since 95, 38 












Labor market:  
Overall indices: 
- Labor freedom  
- Labor market rigidity index 








since 05, 38 









- Labor force participation 
rate 
- Female participation rate 
- Male participation rate 
- Employment outside 
agriculture that does not 
contribute to Social Security 
 
OECD and  
Rama, Artecona (2002) 
Rama, Artecona (2002) 




91-07, 30  
91-99, 36  
91-99, 36 









Hiring and firing:  
- Hiring and firing practices 
 
- Hiring and firing regulations 
 























- Flexibility of wage 
  Determination 
- Centralized collective  
  Bargaining 
- Coverage of collective  






















- Unemployment rate  
 
- Long term unemployment  
  (% of labor force)  
- Female unemployment, (% 
  of Labor Force) 
- Male unemployment, (% of 
  Labor Force) 
- Discouraged workers (% of 
  labor force)  
      - male  
      - female 
- Non-employment rate: 
   (= 15 - 65 years old - 






Rama, Artecona (2002) 
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- Vulnerable employment  (% 
  of total employment)  
WDI gaps,  28  empv 
Remuneration: 
- Minimum wage relative to  
average value added per 
worker 









since 95, 36 
 
 




















- Trade Union Members (% 
  of employees) 
- Total trade union  




Rama, Artecona (2002) 
 
 










- Replacement Rate for long 
term unemployment (average 
net rate in %) 
- Replacement Rate for initial 
phase of unemployment 









since 01, 29 
 
 









Labor market programs: 
- Active labor market 
  program expenditures (% of 
  GDP) 
- Education/training 
  expenditures for 







since 91, 29 
 
 







Strikes and lock-outs: 
- Number per year 
- Workdays lost 
 
Rama, Artecona (2002) 
Rama, Artecona (2002) 
 
91-99, 30  





a) Probability of tax fraud 
detection 
- Tax administration 
   expenditure (in % of GDP) 
- Tax administration staff per  
   taxpayer 
- Number of tax auditors per 
   taxpayer, in o/oo  
- Verification activities per 
   taxpayer 
- Coverage (number of  
completed actions/taxpayers) 
- Number of citizens per tax 
  administration staff 
- Social security tax 
   collection rate 
- Police per 100th. population 
 
b) Punishment  
 - Number prisoners (per 100 
th. population) 



























since  05, 23  
 
since 03, 33  
 
since 03, 33  
 








since  97, 35  
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- Fine rate 
- Sentencing rate 
c) Risk aversion of tax 













Educational system  
- Educational attainment 
- Public spending on  
  education, total (% of GDP), 
- Pupil-teacher ratio, primary 
- Pupil-teacher ratio, second. 
- School enrollment, 
secondary  (% gross) 
- School enrollment, tertiary 





























Innovation potential  
- ICT expend. (% of GDP) 
 
- R&D. exp. (% of GDP) 
 





- Company Spending on 
R&D 
 






































Social Capital, social norms: 
(e.g. degree of organizational 
membership of population) 
- Trust other people in 
  country  
- Accepting a bribe justifiable 
 
- Justifiable: claiming govern- 
   ment benefits to which you 
   are not entitled 
- Justifiable: avoiding fare on 
   public transport  










































- Cheating on taxes  










- Family important in life 
 
- Spend time with friends 
 
- Belong to labor unions  
 
- Belong to political parties  
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- Income equality (should be 
made more equal) 
- Importance of eliminating 
big income inequalities 
- Govt. should take more 
responsibility 
- Govt. should be more open 
to public 
- Govt. should allow more 
freedom for individuals 



































Religion:   
- Believe in god 
 
- Importance of god in life 
 
- Religious fraction in 
population 
- Religion fractionalization 
 
- Spend time with people at  
  church, mosque, 
synagogue 
- Spend time with people at 
  sport, culture, commun. org. 






La Porta (1999) 
 






































- Corruption  
 
- Corruption 
- Extent of Political corruption 
 
- Impact of business costs of 
  corruption 
- Reliability of bribes 



















only 01,  35 















Quantity and quality of 
public goods provision: 
- Quality of public schools 
 
- Confidence in educ. system 
 
- Overall infrastructure quality
 
- Reliability of police services 
 
- Irregular payments in public 
utilities 
- Irregular payments in 
exports & imports 
- Differences in quality of 
healthcare 
- Confidence in soc.sec.syst. 
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- Confidence in Parliament 
 














Efficiency of public goods 
provision: 
- Wastefulness of 
government spending 




















Quality of State 
representatives:  
- Competence of public 
officials rel. to priv. sector 
- Satisfaction with people in 
national office 
- Favoritism in decisions of 
government officials 
- Diversion of public funds to 
companies etc. 
- Public trust of politicians 
 
- Bribes for influencing laws, 
policies, regulations, or 
decrees 
- Prevalence of illegal 
political donations 
- Effectiveness of law-making 
  bodies 
- Quality of information regar. 
  changes in policies & regul. 
- Policy consequences of 
legal political donations  











































































Quality of enterprise  
representatives: 
- Efficacy of executive boards
- Confidence in major 
companies 
- Ethical behavior of firms 
 
- Willingness to delegate 
authority 
- Extent of staff training 
 
- Cooperation in labor-
employer relations 
- Efficacy of supervisory 













































- Socioeconomic conditions 
 
- Confidence in regional 
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Decentralization  
- Decentralization of 
economic policymaking  
- Regulatory obstacles to 














State of cluster 








- Cost of crime for business 
 
- Organized crime  
 
- “Serious“ crime (per 100th. 
pop.):  
   - Homicide  
 
   - Assault  
 
   - Drug trafficking 
 
- ”Light“ crime (per 100th. 
   pop.): 
   - Auto theft 
 
   - Burglary  
 
   - Robbery 
 
- Total acts of crime  
 
- Indicator of typical informal 
  activity, e.g. illegal  
  employment in construction 
 
Prisoners per 100 th. pop. 
 
Police per 100 th. pop.  
 



































































































Feelings and Expectations: 
- Feeling of happiness 
 
- Satisfaction with financial 
situation of household 
- Satisfaction with your life 
 
- Recession expectations  
 
- Interest in politics 
 
- Satisfaction with the way 
democracy develops 
- In democracy, the 
economic system runs badly 
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and have too much 
squabbling 
- Democracies aren´t good at 
maintaining order 
- Democracy may have 




































Inequality of income: 
- Gini 
 
- Richest 10% to poorest 
10% 
 










since 96, 35  
 








- Proportion of seats held by 
women in national parliament 
(%) 
- Gender empowerment 
measure 
- Female labor participation 
rate 
- Male labor participation rate 
 
- Female unemployment (% 
of LF) 








Rama & Artecona 
(2002) 
Rama & Artecona 
(2002) 
Rama & Artecona 
(2002) 








91-99, 36  
 
91-99, 36  
 
91-99, 31  
 
















- Dependents to working-age 
persons  
- Population ages 65 and 
above (% of total) 
Population structure: 






















Financial secrecy   
Opacity score of the financial 
secrecy index 
Bank secrecy dummy  
(1 = bank secrecy law is relatively 
effective; 0 = no bank secrecy law 
or not effective) 
 











Credit indicators:  
- Access to credit 
 
- Domestic credit (% of GDP) 
 
- Credit market regulations 
 
- Venture capital availability 
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   (Visa) 
- Standard deviation of  










quality  index  
 
- Institutions Climate Index 
  (24 OECD countries) 
 
- Human Development Index  
 
- Economic Freedom 
 
- Economic Freedom 
- Business Freedom  
Theo Eicher, Univ. of. 















since 95, 38 














- Money in cash holdings 
relative to M2 or per capita  
- Estimates  of unofficial GDP
  (% of official GDP) 
- Informal sector  
 
- Cheating on taxes 
justifiable 
- Extra payments/bribes 
 
- Employment in unofficial 
economy in the capital of the 
country as % of official labor 
- Share of sales reported for 
  tax purposes 










Global Urban Indicators 
Database 2000 
 




since 91, 35  
 
since 00,  
gaps, 38 
since 91, 
gaps, 38  
since 95, 
gaps, 38 
93 and 98, 4  
 
 





















- Legal origin of country 
(British, French, German, 
Scandinavian, Socialistic) 
- Average temperature 
- Average cloudiness  
- Latitude 
- Religious fractionalization 
- Ethnic fractionalization 
index 
- Ethnic fractionalization 
index 
- Language fractionalization 





Alesina et al. (2003) 
Alesina et al. (2003) 




























In the forth column (years) an “s.” denotes “since” followed by the last two digits of the first year for 
which data area available for at least one country. In brackets the number of missing countries is 
indicated abbreviated by c.m., i.e. “countries missing”, e.g. “s. 05 (7c.m.). meaning first year with 
observations is 2005 where 7 countries are missing. 
 
gaps y. = there are gaps regarding some years but not regarding countries.  
 
Source: own compilation. 
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Appendix 2: Data on currency holdings, currency holdings abroad and other monetary 
aggregates 
 
The two primary sources used in collecting the data on monetary aggregates were International 
Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund (IFS) and regarding EMU countries the 
monetary statistics of the European Central Bank (ECB). Since the inception of the EMU monetary 
aggregates for EMU member countries are not published by the IFS but estimates are available from 
the ECB.  
 
To consider the issue of currency holdings outside the respective jurisdiction of the sample countries, 
estimates of these holdings were considered. Following the literature there are mainly two currencies 
affected by currency holdings abroad, which are the US Dollar and the Euro (Rogoff, 1998, Seitz, 
1995, Porter and Judson, 1996). For these two currencies adjustments for estimated currency 
holdings abroad have been made based on available estimates. Since for the USA the estimates for 
the foreign share of currency range between about 50 to 70 percent we used the mid range figure of 
60 percent. Regarding the Euro there are two estimates available: One for the former DM holdings 
abroad from the year 1995 performed by the Bundesbank (Seitz, 1995) and one by the ECB based 
among others on net shipments of Euro notes outside the Euro area (Fischer et al., 2004). For 2006 
the ECB estimated that between 10 to 20 percent of the total value of euro currency in circulation was 
held outside the euro area (European Commission, 2007). The mid-range of this estimate, i.e. 15 
percent (about 78.6 billion Euros in 2006) is very close to the interpolated former estimate of currency 
holdings abroad by the Bundesbank: Assuming that the 1994 estimated DM currency holdings abroad 
increase by the estimated average growth of DM currency holdings abroad on average during 1975-
1994 (both converted into Euros) yields 78 billion Euros in 2006. The estimated total Euro currency 
holdings abroad were allocated to the individual EMU countries using the shares of EMU countries’ 
currency in circulation.  
 
 
Appendix 3: The assumption of income velocity of currency used in the SE 
 
The assumed value of income velocity of currency is crucial because the estimates of the SE are 
directly proportional and thus extremely sensitive to it.  
 
Currency velocity in the official economy is obtained by dividing official GDP by currency in circulation 
(velocity =    official GDP/ currency). 
Previous studies estimating the size of the SE argued that since the velocity of currency in the SE is 
difficult to estimate and as long as there is no better knowledge about velocity of currency in general, 
one has to accept the assumption of “equal” currency velocity in the official and unofficial economy 
(e.g. Schneider, 1986, p. 665). Schneider (2007, p. 31) argues that one has to accept the assumption 
of “equal” money velocity in both sectors. But it is unclear what “money” means, i.e. whether it is 
currency or which monetary aggregate.  
 
For the following reasons this assumption needs to be discussed:  
 
- Official GDP always includes some estimate of unofficial GDP (e.g. unofficial production in 
agriculture is included in official GDP, because agricultural GDP is calculated by multiplying all 
farmland by average price, e.g. Braakmann (2004)). Hence, if this estimate of unofficial activity is 
deducted from official GDP and the resulting “official transactions GDP” divided by currency, we 
obtain a corrected official velocity figure smaller than official velocity.  
 
- Most importantly, however, and stressed by few authors such Breusch (2005b, p. 33, and Hill, 
2002), the assumption of equality ignores that currency represents a very small part in the money 
supply of the official economy: For instance, currency to M2 ratios in 2007 in the industrial countries of 
our sample stood between merely 1 percent in Iceland and 11.2 percent in Italy! Regarding the   67
developing countries in our sample this ratio in 2007 stood between 6.6 percent in Turkey and 17.1 
percent in Bulgaria. Hence, using the official GDP velocity of currency appears to be an extreme 
assumption which vastly overstates the function of currency and transmits this mistake to the 
estimates of the SE.  
 
- There is also a long term trend decline in income velocities of broad monetary aggregates, which is 
true for all countries except Korea, where it is relatively stable and two Eastern European countries, 
which are special cases due to transition. During the past three decades the scissor between velocity 
of currency and that of broad monetary aggregates widened: today in most industrial countries M2 
velocity is merely 3 to 10 percent of currency velocity. In Iceland and the UK it is merely about 2 
percent. Hence, estimates based on currency velocity can be reduced by this large proportion if one 
gives M2 velocity preference on the grounds discussed above. Years ago, there was an intense 
debate on estimates of the shadow economy for Canada, summarized by Hill (2002). On the basis of 
this debate Hill suggested the income velocity of currency to lie in a range of 2 to 4. Like Klovland 
(1984) he also proposed to provide several estimates. Thus, he argued that Schneider’s estimate for 
the Canadian underground economy in 1996 of about 15 percent of official GDP would instead be 2 – 
4 percent of GDP (Hill, 2002,p, 1649)., which incidentally corresponds well to a later estimate of the 
maximum potential underground activity by Statistics Canada (2006). Given the strong long term 
trend decline in income velocities of broad monetary aggregates Hill’s suggested velocity range would 
correspond today to a range of 1-3. And this corresponds well to our first scenario, table 9, below.   
 
- Non-cash payments are used for transactions in the SE for several reasons: The SE will adapt to 
regulations preventing money laundering through elaborate means to circumvent these rules. The 
sheer number of electronic payments may prevent a gapless control and auditing, which may also 
prove too expensive to be pursued. 
 
- Velocities jump largely from country to country even among otherwise similar ones. These 
differences are not well understood and have thus not been clarified. There are a few analyses of 
velocity (e.g. Porter and Judson, 1996), which identify major determinants, such as the interest rate, 
inflation, ratio of revenue to GDP as a proxy for underground activity, violent crime, noncash-
payments, ATMs, and largest denomination of domestic currency in circulation. Nearly all of these 
variables turn out to be statistically significant with expected signs. But differences in these 
determinants between countries such as, for instance, UK, France, and Germany appear to be minor. 
And even though, for instance, the use of noncash-payments is higher in the UK than in Germany, the 
reasons for this are unclear and we still have little explanation for the large velocity differences.  
 
- An own analysis of currency velocity largely confirmed the findings of Porter and Judson (1996), but 
is also not able to solve our problem: specifically, we ran for our sample a regression of currency 
velocity (with currency being adjusted for currency holdings abroad) against real GDP per capita in 
purchasing power parity, the short term interest rate, CPI inflation, the ratio of total government 
revenues to GDP, business cost of corruption, administrative burden, organized crime, dummy for 
frequency of wage payments, dummy for the largest denomination of domestic currency in circulation, 
and credit cards per capita. The total number of countries that have these data is 26 and the 
regression performs quite well, explaining about 82 percent of the total variation in currency velocity. 
Statistically significant factors, that increase velocity, are the interest rate and inflation (because they 
are the opportunity cost of holdings currency), frequency of wage payments and credit cards per 
capita (because they both lower currency demand and thus increase velocity). All other independent 
variables are statistically insignificant, although most of them have the expected sign. This analysis 
provides at least one hint as to why velocities differ so dramatically between otherwise similar 
countries: Credits cards per capita are much higher in the UK than either in France or Germany. But 
again, this does not clarify why this is so.  
 
- Given these facts, we produced the following velocity assumptions: First we established clusters of 
countries which we consider relatively similar. These are EMU and industrial countries, on the one 
hand, and other developing countries, including our eastern European counties, on the other hand. 
Thus, we used averages of velocities of these two country groups. Second, owing to the trend in   68
velocities only the last available year 2007 was used. Third, from the above it appears that currency is 
much more an extreme than M2. Hence, our range of velocities used to calculate three scenarios is 
given by M2 velocity, on the one end, and a weighted currency-M1 velocity, where M1 is weighted 
75% and currency 25%, on the other hand. These latter weights allowed to reproduce the very large 
estimated size of the SE for Germany in 2007 calculated by Schneider et al. (2010), namely 16.7% of 
official GDP. Also with this velocity assumption the averages of the estimated SE sizes are roughly 
equal in both studies regarding those countries for which estimates were produced here. Three 
scenarios were thus calculated:  
 
-  scenario 1: income velocity of M2 (table 9),  
-  scenario 2: income velocity of M1, (table 10), 
-  scenario 3: income velocity of M1 and currency, where M1 velocity is weighted 75% and 
currency velocity is weighted 25% (table 11).  
 
For each country in tables 9-11 the average velocity of the group to which it belongs was used. 
Without using averages, the differences in the estimates of the SE would be implausibly large among 
otherwise similar countries due to jumps in the respective velocity from country to country. Hence, it is 
surprising how in studies which produce estimates of the SE for many countries, these estimates are 
not fluctuating widely, although the velocities of these countries are extremely different. Presumably, 
these studies used either an average velocity of all countries or they applied the velocity of one 
country for all. But the approach chosen is not explained.  
 
Finally, monetary aggregates for which velocities were calculated, i.e. currency and M1, were both 
adjusted for estimated currency holdings abroad, meaning that velocities are slightly higher than 
without this adjustment. 
 
 
Appendix 4: Which velocity assumption is consistent with the micro evidence? 
 
We can compare the resulting estimates of the size of the SE with micro evidence from surveys and 
other sources. The following summary of selected micro evidence, irrespective of the source, 
suggests for the industrial countries that shadow economic activity, including crime related activity, 
has merely a potential maximum of up to a few percent of GDP. Hence, this corresponds on average 
best to our scenario 1 and thus to income velocity of M2 (table 9).  
 
Size of crime related activities: 
 
Statistics Canada (2006) cites evidence of the early 1990s for several countries:  
- For Canada drug related activities were estimated at 0.3% to 0.6% of GDP. To this Statistics 
Canada was adding an allowance for other illegal goods and services to arrive at an estimated 1% of 
GDP for illegal production and services.  
- For France evidence is cited that illegal activity amounted to 0.1% of GDP.  
- For the USA illegal activity was estimated at 1.5% of GDP noting that more things are illegal in the 
US than in many other OECD countries and that drugs is still essentially an American problem. Derek 
Blades of the UN commission of Europe is cited: “For these reasons it can be asserted with some 
degree of confidence that for most OECD countries the inclusion of illegal production in GDP could 
not possibly add more than 1% and, on the evidence from France, probably much less than this.” 
- For Germany the damage of illegal activity is estimated at 0.4% of GDP (11 billion Euros in 2008, 
see Bundeskriminalamt (2008), p. 64).   
 
This suggests that the estimates of crime related shadow economic activity shown in table 9, which is 
based on M2 velocity, are already relatively high, although this is the lowest velocity of the discussed 
range. Hence, to obtain estimates of the crime related shadow economy - using the money demand 
method - consistent with the micro evidence suggests using a velocity of M2 or lower.  
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Plausibility calculations of shadow economic activity:   
 
Since the 1990s Statistics Canada performed an item by item analysis of potentially missing 
underground transactions and concluded that a maximum potential for the SE in Canada would be 5.2 
percent of official GDP (Statistics Canada, 2006). This consists of a maximum of 2.7 percent value of 
underground production (which, however, is not actually missing because otherwise it would be 
added to official GDP as stressed by Statistics Canada), a maximum of 1 percent of illegal production 
activity, and a maximum of 1.5 percent of undeclared income for tax purposes which is nevertheless 
recorded for national accounts.  
 
For Germany simple plausibility calculations show that estimates of the SE of 16 percent of official 
GDP are beyond credibility. For 2010 this equals about 390 billion Euros which is the value of 1000 
soccer stadiums each year of the size of that in Munich of 70000 seats built in 2005 at a cost of 350 
million Euros. This estimate is also equivalent to 9070 Euros earned in the SE each year by each 
employed and unemployed person (43 million people). Or at an average wage of 10 Euros per hour 
this means that each of these 43 million people would work in the SE each year 907 hours equivalent 
to working each of the 52 weekends per year both days almost 9 hours. Since for Germany less than 
10% of the population in the 18-74 year group stated that they have carried out black market activities 
the number of people would reduce to about less than 7 million but this includes those who worked 
only once or very few times in the shadow. Thus, the number of people working regularly 
underground must be much smaller. Just to make an assumption we assume this number to be half, 
i.e. 3.5 million. If black market activities in a narrow sense constitute about 50% of total shadow 
economic activity (an implicit assumption by Schneider and Enste, 2006, p. 188), i.e. .5*390 = 195 
billion Euros, then each of these about 3.5 million people would need to earn about 56000 Euros a 
year or 4640 Euros each month. But there would be an additional 195 billion Euros earned by other 
entities including crime. Considering a) how well companies are monitored by tax investigators and by 
the special police force against shadow economic activity, b) that the number of persons is relatively 
small who are related to crime, and c) the unwillingness of people to take the relatively high risk of 
being detected caused, for instance, by the invitation of the State to report anonymously tax offenses, 
the resulting number of entities earning these 195 billion Euros is accordingly small. Even if it would 
be as large as 1 million, just to make an assumption, each of them would earn 190000 Euros year 
after year unnoticed by the auditors and special police. 
 
Even if this would be credible, a production of this magnitude (1000 soccer stadiums each year) could 
not go unnoticed by the population. And even the special police force (“Finanzkontrolle 
Schwarzarbeit”) established by the Finance Ministry in 2004 of nearly 7000 officers at a cost of about 
500 million Euros per year was not able to detect this kind of production but only a tiny fraction of it, 
namely about 600 million Euros in alleged damages per year including fines (0.015% of the 390 billion 
Euros), of which, however, only about 50 million Euros were actually raised (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2008). For further plausibility checks concerning Germany see Koch (2007) and Graf (2007). Koch 
(2007) provides a detailed assessment that also shows that the estimate of 16% SE relative to official 
GDP for Germany is not credible.  
  
Micro survey evidence: 
 
The national surveys of living standards and working conditions of the population mostly include 
questions regarding additional business, part-time work or moonlighting, but such work includes legal 
and officially registered and taxed part time work so it cannot be interpreted as black market or 
shadow economic activity.  
 
However, there are few valuable surveys concerned only with shadow economic activity. For 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, Germany and the United Kingdom, the Rockwool Foundation   
carried out such a survey in 2001, which was repeated for Germany in 2004, 2005 and 2006 
(Pedersen, 2003, Feld and Larsen, 2005, and Feld, 2010). Black market activities as a ratio to official 
GDP were estimated for Denmark to have been 1.8%, Norway 1.1%, Sweden 1.0%, Germany 1.3% 
and UK, 0.6%.    70
The proportion of the population in the 18-74 age group who stated that they have carried out black 
activities within the last 12 months (which may have been only once) was between 20,3% in 
Denmark, 17.3% in Norway, 11.1% in Sweden, 10.4 in Germany and 7.8% in the UK.  
 
The results for Germany in the years 2004-2006 show a decreasing trend in this participation to below 
9% as well as in the estimated ratio to official GDP. This ratio was estimated for 2001 at 1.35%, for 
2004 at 1.01%, and for 2006 below 1%. However, in Feld and Larsen (2006) and in Feld (2010) larger 
ratios of estimated black activities to GDP are also presented, namely 4% in 2001 decreasing to 2.5% 
in 2006. Graf (2007) criticizes the reason for these higher numbers, namely the assumption of the 
authors that had black market activities taken place in official markets, their value could have been 
three times as high, as incorrect due to the budget constraints of market participants. Also the 
emphasis by Feld and Larsen (2005) that their estimates may be lower limits of the black market 
economy are criticized, because:  
- it is not clear that respondents underreport activities, 
- there are questions regarding the role of answers in the estimates where respondents may have  
  been active in the black market economy only once or very few times in a year, 
- one cannot exclude that respondents included in their answers activities, which are not black market 
  activities such as engagements in neighborly help, membership associations, honorary offices etc.,  
  (Graf 2007, p. 199).  
 
Germany established in 2004 a special police force of nearly 7000 officers with the sole task of 
uncovering shadow economic activity (the so-called “Finanzkontrolle Schwarzarbeit”) as a subunit of 
customs under the supervision of the Finance Ministry.
28 The costs of this police force are about 500 
million Euros per year and despite large monetary targets for each officer concerning underground 
activity to be uncovered the final revenues generated by this task force for the pension, health 
insurance and tax system are miniscule: According to an analysis by the national court of auditors 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2008) the pension system received only 1.7% of the allegedly uncovered 
losses, the tax system received 4.4% of uncovered losses and of the levied fines only 22% were 
actually paid. This suggests that the police, bureaucracies and courts were busy but with little result.  
 
Overall the court of auditors estimates that only about 8% of all losses allegedly uncovered by the 
task force (of about 600 million Euros in 2006 including fines) is generated as actual revenue (about 
50 million Euros in 2006). But this does not account for the considerable but unknown costs incurred 
by the justice system due to the large number of initiated prosecutions which failed in courts and other 
costs such as lost working hours and lost reputation of businesses and persons that were indicted but 
found innocent. Nobody estimated these costs. There is no evidence about the efficacy of this task 
force. The court of auditors criticized the supervisory authority, the Finance Ministry, for not initiating 
an analysis of the efficacy of this expensive unit. The statistics prepared by the unit do not allow 




Appendix 5:  Sensitivity scenarios II and III  
 
 
                                                 
28 The officers were former border customs officers but in this function redundant after accession of Eastern 
European countries to the EU.   71
Table 10: Scenario II of the size of the shadow economy (SE) and individual causes (using average M1 
velocity) 1/ 
(in percent of official GDP)
"Crime" 
Administra- Tax Social  secu- Quality  of  shadow Total 
tive burden burden  rity burden public servi- Non "crime-" economy  Shadow
(wef605) (ttrgdp) (ssccgdp) ces (wef508) related SE (wef111) Economy
Australia 0.00 0.84 n.a. 1.06 2.4
Austria 0.11 0.71 0.26 1.13 2.2 1.5 3.7
Belgium 0.90 1.06 0.34 1.85 4.2 2.7 6.9
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.72 9.8
Canada 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 5.7 5.7
Cyprus n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.59 7.2
Czech Republic n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 7.2
Denmark 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.6 0.6
Estonia 1.58 n.a. n.a. 0.72 3.4
Finland 0.00 0.43 0.22 0.69 1.3 0.6 1.9
France 0.07 0.29 0.08 0.74 1.2 1.8 3.0
Germany 1.34 0.38 0.34 0.88 2.9 2.4 5.4
Greece 0.00 1.82 0.64 0.97 3.4 4.4 7.8
Hungary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0 6.0
Iceland 0.00 1.05 0.16 0.94 2.1 0.7 2.8
Ireland 1.66 1.56 0.22 1.78 5.2 3.3 8.5
Italy 0.00 0.71 0.19 2.40 3.3 5.9 9.2
Japan 0.93 1.06 0.91 2.61 5.5 7.8 13.3
Korea, Republic of 0.74 1.45 0.67 1.93 4.8 5.3 10.1
Latvia 0.07 n.a. n.a. 0.93 4.8
Lithuania 0.00 n.a. n.a. 1.12 5.3
Luxembourg 0.00 1.14 0.16 0.94 2.2 1.9 4.2
Malta n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.73 3.5
Mexico 1.48 0.28 n.a. 0.53 6.8
Netherlands 0.10 1.23 0.85 1.44 3.6 4.9 8.5
New Zealand 0.00 0.76 n.a. 1.18 2.4
Norway 0.55 0.57 0.19 1.29 2.6 1.3 3.9
Poland 0.00 0.74 n.a. 1.68 6.8
Portugal 1.38 1.60 1.26 1.42 5.7 2.2 7.9
Romania 0.52 n.a. n.a. 1.37 5.9
Slovak Republic 1.44 1.20 1.33 2.37 6.3 7.4 13.7
Slovenia 0.04 n.a. n.a. 2.34 4.8
Spain 1.17 0.62 0.36 0.91 3.1 3.2 6.3
Sweden 0.07 0.53 0.64 0.88 2.1 1.3 3.4
Switzerland 0.00 0.39 0.42 0.74 1.5 2.2 3.8
Turkey 0.29 1.38 0.44 1.06 3.2 4.8 8.0
United Kingdom 0.85 1.06 0.17 1.36 3.4 3.7 7.1
United States 0.04 0.55 0.05 0.95 1.6 4.5 6.1
1/ Velocity assumption of currency used in the unofficial economy: average of M1 velocities of two country 
groups: for country group industrial countries, incl. EMU: 3.49; for developing countries, incl. Eastern Europe: 
5.33.  See also appendix 3 and the note in table 9.
Source: own calculations.  
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Table 11: Scenario III of the size of the shadow economy (SE) and of individual causes (using 3/4 average M1
 velocity and 1/4 average currency velocity) 1/
(in percent of official GDP)
Administra- Tax Social  secu- Quality  of  Total  Schneider
tive burden burden  rity burden public servi- Non "crime-" "Crime" SE Shadow (2010)
(wef605) (ttrgdp) (ssccgdp) ces (wef508) related SE (wef111) Economy av. 99-07
Australia 0.0 2.6 n.a. 3.3 7.6 14.6
Austria 0.4 2.2 0.8 3.5 6.9 4.6 11.5 9.8
Belgium 2.8 3.3 1.1 5.8 12.9 8.5 21.5 22.5
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.9 21.2 38.5
Canada 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.8 17.9 16.3
Cyprus n.a. n.a. n.a. 14.3 15.6 29.4
Czech Republic n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 15.7 19.8
Denmark 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 18.2
Estonia 3.4 n.a. n.a. 1.6 7.3 40.3
Finland 0.0 1.4 0.7 2.2 4.2 1.8 5.9 18.5
France 0.2 0.9 0.3 2.3 3.7 5.7 9.3 15.4
Germany 4.2 1.2 1.1 2.7 9.2 7.5 16.7 16.1
Greece 0.0 5.7 2.0 3.0 10.7 13.7 24.4 29.9
Hungary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0 13.1 25.8
Iceland 0.0 3.3 0.5 2.9 6.7 2.2 8.8 16.2
Ireland 5.2 4.9 0.7 5.5 16.2 10.3 26.5 16.0
Italy 0.0 2.2 0.6 7.5 10.3 18.2 28.5 27.2
Japan 2.9 3.3 2.8 8.1 17.2 24.3 41.4 11.4
Korea, Republic of 1.6 3.2 1.4 4.2 10.4 11.5 21.9 28.2
Latvia 0.1 n.a. n.a. 2.0 10.4 41.7
Lithuania 0.0 n.a. n.a. 2.4 11.4 31.9
Luxembourg 0.0 3.6 0.5 2.9 7.0 5.9 12.9 9.9
Malta n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.4 10.9 27.0
Mexico 3.2 0.6 n.a. 1.2 14.8 30.2
Netherlands 0.3 3.8 2.6 4.5 11.2 15.1 26.3 13.0
New Zealand 0.0 2.4 n.a. 3.7 7.4 13.2
Norway 1.7 1.8 0.6 4.0 8.1 4.0 12.1 19.5
Poland 0.0 1.6 n.a. 3.6 14.7 28.0
Portugal 4.3 5.0 3.9 4.4 17.6 7.0 24.6 22.5
Romania 1.1 n.a. n.a. 3.0 12.8 36.3
Slovak Republic 3.1 2.6 2.9 5.1 13.7 15.9 29.7 19.7
Slovenia 0.1 n.a. n.a. 5.1 10.5 28.0
Spain 3.7 1.9 1.1 2.8 9.5 10.1 19.6 22.9
Sweden 0.2 1.6 2.0 2.7 6.6 4.1 10.7 19.6
Switzerland 0.0 1.2 1.3 2.3 4.8 6.9 11.7 8.7
Turkey 0.6 3.0 1.0 2.3 6.9 10.4 17.3 32.9
United Kingdom 2.6 3.3 0.5 4.2 10.7 11.4 22.1 12.9
United States 0.1 1.7 0.2 2.9 4.9 14.0 18.9 8.8
1/ Velocity assumption of currency used in unofficial transactions: 3/4 M1 velocity and 1/4 currency velocity:
for country group  industrial countries, incl. EMU: 10.85; for developing countries, incl. Eastern Europe: 11.56. 
See the explanations given in appendix 3 and the note in table 9.
Source: own calculations.  